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With tropical deforestation a major contributor to greenhouse gas emissions and 
biodiversity loss, the land use decisions of small-scale farmers at the forest margins have 
important implications for the global environment.  In some tropical forests, such as the 
Eastern Brazilian Amazon, farmers practice a shifting cultivation system that maintains 
large amounts of land under forest fallow.  I examine whether local benefits of fallowing 
such as soil restoration, erosion mitigation and hydrological regulation are of sufficient 
value to farmers to stem the expansion of permanent cropland at the expense of forest.   
I quantify the value of ecosystem services provided by fallow to agriculture and 
test whether local forest externalities are economically significant, using farm survey and 
GIS data from the Eastern Amazon.  I estimate a production function to determine the 
contribution of on-farm and upstream fallow to income, using an instrumental variables 
approach to address endogeneity.  I find that on-farm and upstream fallow are both 
associated with higher farm income.  This result both confirms the agronomic evidence 
that fallow boosts yields and suggests that fallow provides positive hydrological 
externalities to downstream farms.   
I also examine whether farmers respond strategically to their neighbors’ land use, 
taking advantage of ecosystem services provided by upstream farms.  I use a spatial 
econometric model to estimate the effect of upstream farms’ fallow on downstream land 
allocation.  I find no evidence that farmers alter their fallowing based on land use 
upstream.     
I then investigate whether market failures encourage fallowing.  If farmers cannot 
purchase inputs used in cultivation due to liquidity constraints, they may keep more land 
under fallow than optimal.  I use the estimated production function parameters to 
determine whether each farm’s allocation of land between cropping and fallow is 
efficient from an individual perspective.  I then estimate the effect liquidity indicators on 
land use efficiency.  I find that over-fallowing is negatively associated with commercial 
credit use and off-farm income, suggesting that liquidity constraints do hinder 
agricultural intensification.  Because I find evidence to support the existence of positive 
externalities to fallow, the loosening of liquidity constraints that encourage fallowing has 
ambiguous implications for community-level welfare. 
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1.1 Tropical deforestation and shifting cultivation: a global 
issue   
With tropical deforestation a major contributor to greenhouse gas emissions and 
biodiversity loss, the land-use decisions of small-scale farmers at the forest margins have 
important implications for the global environment.  In some tropical forested areas, such 
as the Zona Bragantina in the Eastern Brazilian Amazon, farmers practice a shifting 
cultivation system that maintains large amounts of land under forest fallow.  This study 
explores farmers’ incentives for maintaining forest fallow, which provides many of the 
same environmental services as mature forests.  I examine whether local benefits of 
fallowing such as soil restoration, erosion mitigation, and hydrological regulation are of 
sufficient value to farmers to stem the expansion of permanent cropland at the expense of 
secondary forest.   
Shifting cultivation—the rotation of cropping and restorative fallow periods—has 
been practiced by farmers for thousands of years and is still common today as a form of 
traditional agriculture in tropical countries.  The process involves clearing forested land 
for one or two seasons of cultivation, followed by long fallow periods in which forests 
are allowed to regenerate.  An estimated 300 million people worldwide rely on this 
extensive form of farming for their livelihoods1. Shifting cultivation is likely to remain a 
predominant practice in tropical countries as expansion of settlement into forest areas 
continues and opportunities for small-scale farmers remain limited.   
 
1 Current estimates of the number of shifting cultivators are hard to come by.  The 300-million figure is 
given by Sanchez (1996) and Brady (1996). 
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Secondary forest fallow provides on-site benefits to farmers, such as soil 
restoration, erosion prevention, and weed and pest curtailment.  It also provides off-site 
services, supplying some of the same local and global public goods as mature forests.  
Understanding the magnitude of secondary forests’ contribution to agricultural 
productivity will be increasingly important as population and economic pressures spur 
farmers to shorten fallow periods, adopt new technologies, and intensify cultivation.  
However, economic studies accurately estimating the value of forest hydrologic 
services are sparse, and results from hydrologic studies are themselves ambiguous as to 
the effects of reforestation on water yields (Bruijnzeel 2004).  Valuing the net benefits of 
forest cover to local populations may also help justify forest conservation efforts with 
global importance (Chomitz and Kumari 1998).  The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
(2005) has identified lack of information about the value of non-market ecosystem 
services as a major knowledge gap hampering informed decision-making on ecosystem 
management.  The Assessment also calls for improved information on the economic 
consequences of ecosystem changes and the links between human welfare and ecosystem 
services, particularly regulating services such as erosion, hydrological, and climate 
regulation.     
I take up this challenge by quantifying the returns to fallowing in agricultural 
production.  I estimate separately the value of on-farm and off-site services supplied by 
forest fallow to determine whether fallow provides economically significant local 
externalities that may justify forest conservation from a local or regional perspective.  I 
also investigate whether farmers allocate land between cultivation and fallow 
strategically, responding to land use on other farms.  Finally, I examine potential barriers 
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to efficient fallow management, such as liquidity constraints that may promote fallowing 
at the expense of intensified cultivation.  
1.2 Valuation of fallow biomass resources: a review 
The study builds upon existing research that has examined the role of fallow and 
forest biomass in agricultural productivity.  While few empirical studies provide 
estimates of the value of fallow biomass and forest cover in agricultural production, those 
that do find that it provides economically important services.  López (1993, 1997, 1998) 
finds village-level fallow biomass to contribute significantly to agricultural profitability 
in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, with a factor share varying between 0.15 and 0.2.  This 
strong effect captures both on-farm soil quality and external hydrological benefits since 
farm- and community-level biomass are likely to be highly correlated.  Mendoza (2004) 
uses the same data set as the present study to estimate the contribution of fallow length to 
plot-level cassava profits, finding a positive but not statistically significant effect.  
However, the author does not control for the endogeneity of fallow management.  
Another study estimates the on-farm value of agroforestry practices in improving soil 
quality in the Philippines (Pattanayak and Mercer 1998).  When balanced against the 
opportunity cost of the land and labor used to maintain hedgerows, the net benefits are 
positive but small.   
Some off-site ecosystem services associated with forest cover have been 
quantified recently as well.  A study in Ruteng National Park, Indonesia, uses 
hydrological modeling to link nearby forest cover to baseflow and to measure the returns 
in agricultural production (Pattanayak and Kramer 2001, Pattanayk and Butry 2005).  
Increases in baseflow significantly raise farm profits, but the effect of afforestation on 
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baseflow is projected to vary considerably over space.  Small forest patches harboring 
bees provide crop pollination services to a coffee plantation in Costa Rica worth $60,000 
per year (Ricketts et al. 2004).        
 Other research emphasizes the costs to farmers from livelihoods based on slash-
and-burn.  Smoke can cause respiratory illness, and accidental fires lead to property 
damage, with one study estimating costs on the order of 0.2% of regional GDP 
(Mendonca et al. 2004, Varma 2003).  These problems have prompted interest in 
“alternatives to slash-and-burn”—land-use options to achieve the dual goals of poverty 
reduction and forest conservation (Tomich et al. 1998).  Suggested technologies include 
enriched fallows, a technique involving seeding fallowed plots with leguminous and fast-
growing trees to speed soil recovery, and “fire-free” land preparation using chop-and-
mulch machinery (Kato et al. 1999). While my study does not examine the negative 
externalities arising from the use of fire in shifting cultivation, a full accounting of the net 
benefits of fallow must incorporate these costs.  
1.3 Case study: the Eastern Amazon’s Zona Bragantina 
The Zona Bragantina offers a compelling case study as a region with over one 
hundred years of agricultural settlement where shifting cultivation persists as the 
principal means of livelihood.  The course of economic development and land use in 
Bragantina may provide insights for frontier regions now being rapidly settled throughout 
the Amazon.  Despite integration into regional markets through railways and roads, 
perennial cash-crop production and processing, and government programs to encourage 
agricultural intensification, shifting cultivation dominates other land-use practices in the 
region.   
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While virtually all virgin forest in Bragantina has been cleared in previous 
decades, roughly 75% of the land area remains under secondary forest (Kato et al. 1999).  
Conversion of land from virgin forest to shifting cultivation results in net losses of above-
ground carbon stocks, but below-ground carbon storage remains stable due to the 
secondary forests’ extensive root systems (Sommer 2000).  Transition to permanent 
cropping would entail significant losses of both above- and below-ground carbon.  
Therefore, current land use in the Zona Bragantina provides a carbon sink that helps 
mitigate global climate change.  However, a linear programming model of the region 
predicts that farmers will significantly decrease average fallow lengths over the next 25 
years, with corresponding net increases in carbon dioxide emissions (Borner 2005). 
Bragantina is among the longest colonized and most densely populated regions of 
the Amazon, but severe challenges remain for poverty alleviation and development.  
Incomes remain low by Brazilian standards.  Per capita income in Bragantina is less than 
75% of the Pará average.  Meanwhile, Pará ranks 17th out of 27 states in terms of human 
development, and 58% of households in rural areas make insufficient income to meet 
basic food needs (Verner 2004).  Population growth in Bragantina fell during the 1990s 
to 1.8%, below the Brazilian average of 2%.   
1.4 Contribution of this study 
I develop a conceptual model of shifting cultivation in the context of the optimal 
control literature on soil fertility and fallow management.  This model distinguishes 
between the on-site benefits of fallowing and the positive externalities of secondary 
forests.  I use this model to explore the implications of decentralized versus collective 
management and liquidity constraints for land use efficiency.  I show that liquidity 
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constraints can encourage over-allocation of land to fallowing by limiting purchased 
inputs used in cultivation.  The implications of such constraints for community welfare 
depend on the existence of positive externalities to fallow and whether fallow is managed 
collectively to account for such externalities.   
The empirical analysis uses cross-sectional farm-level survey data from the Zona 
Bragantina to assess the value of forest fallow services to farmers and test whether 
externalities generated by secondary forests are economically significant in agriculture.  
Well-established private land tenure in the study region allows me to disentangle the on-
farm and externality effects.  I first estimate a crop production function, measuring the 
contributions of on-farm and off-farm forest fallow as factors of production.  I then 
estimate a forest product equation to determine the contribution of forest fallow to 
harvested products.  I address endogeneity issues using an instrumental variables 
approach, as well as modeling spatially-correlated errors to account for variation in 
unobservable factors over space.   
I use geographic information on the location of farms to obtain data on cross-
sectional external forest fallow and other agroecological factors at the farm level.  The 
geographic data improves the specification of the external forest fallow variable, though I 
do not explicitly model the underlying mechanism of the ecosystem services provided by 
on- and off-farm forest fallow.  While fallowing entails dynamic processes that cannot be 
fully captured with cross-sectional data, I use the area under fallow at the time of the 
survey to infer fallow biomass density, considering the long settlement history and 
relatively constant farming practices and demographics in the study region over the past 
several decades.       
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I also investigate using a spatial econometric model whether farms allocate land 
between cultivation and fallow strategically, based on their neighbors’ land use, to take 
advantage of any positive externalities arising from forest fallow.  Farmers who receive a 
productivity boost from their neighbor’s forest fallow may shift their own allocation of 
land towards cultivation to exploit these services.  Identifying this effect is complicated 
by the potential underlying spatial correlation of unobserved factors that may influence 
farmers’ and their neighbors’ land use decisions in similar ways.  I address this concern 
by allowing for spatial correlation in the error of the fallow equation to capture the effects 
of any unobserved variables varying over space that may spur neighboring farms to make 
similar land allocation decisions.    
I then use the estimated value of forest fallow services to examine whether 
farmers in the Zona Bragantina may be allocating land between cultivation and fallow 
inefficiently due to market failures or other constraints.  Ecological studies documenting 
the restorative effects of fallowing on soil quality do not consider the tradeoffs inherent in 
allocating land to fallow rather than cultivation.  While long fallow periods can be a cost-
effective way to restore soil quality and obtain harvestable products for consumption or 
sale, fallowing becomes more costly when the opportunity costs of land and labor are 
considered.  Land must remain out of cultivation for years at a time to ensure 
sustainability of the system, and clearing land of forest fallow requires large amounts of 
labor time.  The total returns to fallowing thus depend on the relative contributions of 
fallow and cultivated land to farm income, as well as the cost of labor used in land 
clearing.   
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If forest fallow does provide positive local externalities, these ecological services 
provide a social, though not individual, rationale for the maintenance of larger fallow 
areas than is privately optimal.  Credit and off-farm employment constraints and other 
market failures offer alternative, though not mutually exclusive, explanations for the 
persistence of long fallow periods, as I discus in the theoretical model.  I consider various 
socioeconomic and agroecological factors as possible determinants of fallow 
management efficiency, using the results of previous studies on tropical deforestation to 
inform the analysis.   
Implications of market failures for fallow management efficiency depend on the 
magnitude of local forest externalities.  Market imperfections that encourage fallowing 
may be welfare-improving for the community if forest fallow provides economically 
significant local externalities.  However, constraints in the absence of positive local 
externalities may hinder farmers’ expansion of profitable agricultural activities, 
suggesting that the rate of deforestation is likely to increase as farmers’ access to markets 
improves.   
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2 Ecology and socioeconomics of shifting cultivation in 
Eastern Amazonia 
Where land is abundant and other inputs are scarce, long fallow periods can be a 
cost-effective way to regenerate soil fertility, control pests and weeds, and otherwise 
restore land for future agricultural uses.  Farmers typically clear forested land by slash-
and-burn: vegetation is cut to the ground, the organic matter is dried and then burned, and 
the ash is used to fertilize the soil.  
2.1 Agricultural profile of the Zona Bragantina 
In the Zona Bragantina of Pará state in the Eastern Brazilian Amazon, traditional 
farmers (caboclos) have made shifting cultivation a mainstay of the economy for over a 
century of settlement.  The Brazilian government initially promoted colonization in the 
mid-19th century to supply the food needs of the state capital, Belém.  Despite 
government initiatives to promote intensive cash crop production, shifting cultivation 
remains the predominant livelihood.  Virtually all of the virgin forest in the region has 
been cleared for several decades, but secondary vegetation covers approximately 75% of 
the total land area (Kato et al. 1999)2. Figure 1 presents a map of the region.      
 
2 Satellite data (e.g., Moran 1994) and farm surveys (e.g., Smith et al. 1999) reveal that secondary forests 
make up a considerable portion of once-deforested land throughout the Amazon—around 30%, according 
to some estimates (Houghton et al. 2000).   
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Figure 1 Municipios in the Zona Bragantina 
Source: http://pt-uf.pt-dlr.de/Shift/english/map/env101.htm, Accessed Nov. 28, 2005 
Interspersing short periods of annual cropping with long fallows on landholdings 
of around 25 hectares, farmers use fallow vegetation (termed capoeira) as a natural 
capital input into crop production.  While family labor and manual land clearing and 
cultivation predominate, hired labor and mechanized equipment may also be used for 
labor-intensive tasks like land preparation, weeding, and harvesting.  A typical one to two 
year cropping sequence includes maize, upland rice, and cowpea, with cassava grown as 
the final crop while fallow vegetation reestablishes (Holscher et al. 1997a).  These annual 
crops are used for home consumption and sale to regional markets.   
Since the mid twentieth century, smallholders have also branched into perennials 
like black pepper, passion fruit, oranges, and coconut, as well as cattle production.  
Perennial cultivation requires use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, which farmers 
also occasionally apply to annuals (Hedden-Dunkhorst 2003).  The initial costs of 
establishing a black pepper plantation, estimated at US$3650 by one study, remain 
11
prohibitive for many farmers, particularly since it yields no crop for the first two years 
after planting before the ten year production cycle begins (Toniolo and Uhl 1995).  
Government programs to promote perennial cash crops, such as financing agro-
processing facilities in the region, spurred increased adoption in the 1970s and 1980s.  
Since then, widespread pest infestations and price fluctuations have dampened 
enthusiasm for passion fruit and black pepper production (Mendoza 2004).    
Binswanger (1991) has documented myriad policies, from agricultural credit to 
tax incentives, that fostered conversion of forests to other land uses and concentration of 
farms into large landholdings during the twentieth century.  More recent policies have 
sought to reverse the trend by funding subsidized credit for small farmers and restricting 
use of forested areas.  Prorural provides old-age pensions, originally offering 50% of the 
legal minimum salary, which was raised to 100% in 1991.  The same year saw the 
introduction of the FNO3 credit program targeting smallholders with loans of $B5000 at 
6% interest.  While technically accessible to all small-scale farmers, loans were reserved 
for those with access to extension services and plans to invest in perennial production.   
In the 2000s, the government established Proambiente, still in its pilot phase, to 
promote economic development and environmental conservation goals concurrently.  The 
new initiative seeks to compensate farms for adopting purportedly sustainable 
agricultural practices by relaxing the terms of agricultural credit and subsidizing certain 
technologies (Nepstad et al. 2004).  Encouraged practices include reforestation of 
degraded lands and chop-and-mulch instead of slash-and-burn land clearing.  Chemical 
fertilizer use is prohibited for borrowers.  A simulation model of Proambiente in the Zona 
 
3 The Fundo Constitucional de Financiamento do Norte, established in 1988 by constitutional mandate, is 
financed by federal tax revenues. 
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Bragantina raises skepticism about the likelihood of achieving increased farmer incomes 
though this program (Borner 2005).    
The Brazilian government has also enacted laws to prevent excessive forest 
clearing on privately owned farms.  Riparian forests hold protected status, and the “Forest 
Code” requires farms to maintain 50% of their land under forest cover.  While 
compliance with the former law is high in the Zona Bragantina, awareness of the latter 
policy is low, and the law is ambiguous regarding secondary forests (Borner 2005). 
The region faces major challenges in improving agricultural productivity due to 
poor quality Oxisol, Spodosol, and Ultisol soils that are vulnerable to acidity and 
aluminum toxicity (Tucker et al. 1998, Holscher et al. 1997).  Experiments varying 
fertilizer treatments in the Zona Bragantina identified phosphorus and nitrogen as major 
limiting factors in crop production and fallow biomass growth (Gehring et al. 1999).   
Soil is relatively homogenous in the region, though rainfall does decrease along a 
gradient from west to east (Borner 2005).  The climate is humid, receiving an average 
rainfall of 2400-2700 mm annually.  Much of the Zona Bragantina lies on terra firme,
land that does not lie directly in the floodplain.  However, farmers in the sample do report 
excess rainfall and drought as two main sources of risk and have had to abandon land 
after flooding caused by heavy rainfall (Borner 2005). 
Farmers are motivated to keep large areas of farmland under forest fallow by 
important on-site benefits.  In the Zona Bragantina, forest products like wood, charcoal, 
and fruits make up around 7% of household income on average (Hedden-Dunkhorst et al. 
2003).  Settlers in the Peruvian Amazon allow secondary vegetation to reestablish largely 
for soil recuperation, though they are also spurred by timber harvesting and lack of 
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resources for cultivation (Smith et al. 1999).  Shifting cultivators near Altamira, Pará, 
leave land under fallow to restore soil fertility and control pests and weeds (Silva-
Forsberg et al. 1997).   
The exact role of fallow and biomass burning in crop production is still 
inadequately understood.  For instance, field studies on maize in Pará found yields to be 
positively associated with fallow length but, surprisingly, to be lower on land cleared 
from mature than secondary forest (Silva-Forsberg et al. 1997).  A review of several 
studies on fallow does not find a conclusive link between decreased fallow age and 
declining yields, though studies from the Eastern Amazon do exhibit such a relationship 
(Mertz 2002).   
2.2 On-site effects of secondary forest 
Recent agronomic research in the study area has shed light on a number of the on-
site restorative functions of fallow vegetation (e.g., Nepstad et al. 2001, Holscher et al. 
1997a, Sommer et al. 2000, Gehring et al. 1999).   These on-site services can be 
characterized as stock effects that benefit the farmer when land is cleared and cultivated.  
Forest cover improves soil fertility and porosity, prevents surface erosion, and controls 
weeds and pests, creating a stock of high quality soil that contributes to agricultural 
productivity.   
Trees improve soil structure through their deep root systems, which increase soil 
permeability to water, retrieve minerals from deeper levels of soil, and bring them to the 
surface in the form of biomass.  Redistribution of nutrients from deep in the soil to the 
surface through leaf litter can raise the levels of phosphorus, carbon, potassium, nitrogen, 
calcium, and magnesium available to other plants (Altieri 1995).  Secondary forests in the 
14
Eastern Amazon have root systems several meters deep that are just as extensive as those 
of mature forests (Nepstad et al. 2001, Sommer et al. 2000).  Their root systems also have 
higher rates of mycorrhizal infection than mature forests.  These nitrogen-fixing bacteria 
allow secondary vegetation roots improved access to deep soil nutrient stocks (Nepstad et 
al. 2001).  Secondary forest roots may also obtain deep soil nutrients in solution during 
water uptake.  The roots tend to remain intact after manual land clearing, fostering rapid 
vegetative regeneration during initial fallow years (Holscher 1997a). 
When fallow biomass is burned in preparation for planting, the resulting ash is 
rich in minerals that fertilize the soil.  The alkaline ash and increased mineral availability 
also raise soil pH, which is particularly beneficial in regions of acidic soil (Altieri 1995).  
An experiment in the Zona Bragantina converting seven-year fallow to cultivation with 
slash and burn found increases in soil pH, cation exchange capacity, potassium, calcium, 
and magnesium in the surface soil layers due to plant ash (Holscher et al. 1997a).  
Burning can also kill weeds and weed seeds, insect pests, bacteria, and fungi.   
Drawbacks of biomass burning include nutrient loss through volatilization and 
decreased uptake of nutrients, leaving the soil vulnerable to leaching of the valuable 
nutrients (Gliessman 1998).  Other temporary effects of burning on soil include reduced 
soil moisture retention and permeability, decreased organic matter, and reduced 
populations of soil microorganisms, but these effects can be quickly moderated by the 
reintroduction of vegetation.  Poorly managed slash-and-burn systems are vulnerable to 
nutrient loss, soil erosion, and invasion of weedy or undesirable plant species (Gliessman 
1998).  In well-managed slash-and-burn systems, the soil retains high levels of carbon 
and nitrogen, tree roots, and myccorhizae.   
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In high rainfall areas like the Amazon, surface erosion is minimized by rapid 
vegetation regrowth on abandoned plots (Sanchez et al. 1982).  In the tropics, erosion 
rates on land under fallow vegetation are comparable to those in natural forests but rises 
considerably during cultivation.  However, forest cover has less impact on gully erosion 
and mass wasting (Bruijnzeel 2004).     
While any type of vegetative ground cover hinders surface erosion, tree canopy 
cover is critical in weed suppression (de Rouw 1995).  In the first phase of weed control 
after fallowing, rapidly reestablishing secondary vegetation crowds out weed species.  In 
the second phase, woody species create a canopy that shades the soil, decimating the 
weed seed bank (Staver 1991).  Shorter fallow periods exacerbate weed infestation when 
the land is brought into cultivation, creating a vicious cycle of diminished agricultural 
productivity and delayed secondary forest succession in subsequent fallow periods.  
Farmers in the Zona Bragantina report that weeding demand more than doubles when 
slash-and-burn land preparation is not used (Borner 2005).    
Longer fallow periods are associated with higher agricultural productivity in 
eastern Amazon sites.  In a study near Altamira, Pará, maize yields under traditional 
caboclo cropping increased significantly with fallow age (Silva-Forsberg et al. 1997).  An 
experimental study in the Zona Bragantina documented reduced rice yields on plots 
fallowed for four instead of ten years, though fertilizer application narrowed the yield gap 
considerably (Kato et al. 1999).   
2.3 Off-site services of secondary forest  
Besides providing a stock of soil nutrients and weed control that benefits the 
farmer when the plot is brought into cultivation, standing forest fallow provides a flow of 
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environmental services, some of which may enhance agricultural productivity locally or 
regionally.  Forest cover has the potential to affect nearby farms’ productivity through the 
hydrological cycle, crop pollination, and tree seed availability.  Few studies indicate 
whether farmers are likely to reap economically significant benefits from these effects.   
Secondary forests in the Amazon perform largely the same hydrological functions 
as mature forests, mitigating the effects of deforestation.  Their deep and extensive root 
systems extract soil water from lower layers (Nepstad et al. 2001).  Meteorological data 
show little difference in evapotranspiration rates between young secondary vegetation 
and mature forest in the Eastern Amazon (Holscher et al. 1997b).  Simulation models of 
precipitation in the Amazon suggest that minimal changes in rainfall from deforestation 
are expected due to the prevalence of secondary vegetation in deforested areas.   
Tree cover (whether mature forest or secondary vegetation) plays an important 
role in the hydrological cycle, both reducing erosion rates on-site, as discussed above, 
and affecting water yield and distribution over space and time.  Forest cover moderates 
peak flows and surface runoff due to increased soil infiltration capacity and 
evapotranspiration of soil water (Hamilton and King 1983, Bruijnzeel 2004), which may 
benefit agricultural activities by lessening floods and waterlogging.  The effect of 
vegetation cover on storm flow becomes less important with higher rainfall intensity, as 
soil infiltration capacity is quickly overwhelmed in extreme rainfall events.  
 Improved infiltration may also lead to increased dry season baseflow in some 
cases, although this effect is not well documented by the scientific literature (Calder 
2002, Bruijnzeel 2004).  A study examining the value of off-farm forest cover in Ruteng 
National Park, Indonesia, does find positive returns to drought mitigation services 
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provided by local forest cover to small-scale agricultural production (Pattanayak and 
Kramer 2001, Pattanayak and Butry 2005).  However, the agroecology of the Indonesian 
case, with its steep slopes and packed, clay soils, contrasts with the conditions in the 
Eastern Amazon, which has relatively flat slopes and sandy soils, making it conducive to 
soil water infiltration even without extensive tree cover.   
Changes in water yield due to deforestation have been documented on a small 
scale, but the effects are less clear on a larger catchment level (Bruijnzeel 2004).  My 
research focuses on localized farm-level changes within the Zona Bragantina, since a 
cross-regional watershed-scale study is not feasible with the data at hand.  To my 
knowledge, no studies have examined whether farmers realize agricultural benefits from 
forest hydrological services in the Amazon.   
Natural habitat such as forest fallow may also provide crop pollination services to 
nearby farms by harboring bees and other insects.  Cereal and root crops grown in the 
Zona Bragantina, such as maize and cassava, do not rely on insect pollinators.  However, 
many widely-grown high-value horticultural crops do, including passion fruit, black 
pepper, and watermelon.  Studies estimating the spatial scale of crop pollination find bees 
pollinate crops within 1-2.5 km of natural habitat, closely tracking their typical foraging 
ranges (Ricketts et al. 2004, Kremen et al. 2004).  Pollination services from nearby forest 
patches of 46-111 hectares increased coffee yields by 20% in Costa Rica (Ricketts et al. 
2004). 
Nearby forest stands are also important for succession of fallowed plots from 
scrub and weedy vegetation to forest.  Woody plants reestablish on fallowed plots not 
only from roots remaining in the soil after cultivation, but also from seeds disbursed by 
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neighboring forests (Nepstad et al. 2001).  Nearby forest stands can ultimately improve 
regional agricultural productivity by speeding up restorative secondary vegetation growth 
on fallowed plots.  A field study in Pará attributes low forest regrowth rates in some Zona 
Bragantina sites to poor soils and a dearth of mature forest stands (Tucker et al. 1998).   
While hydrological, pollination, and tree seed availability can be characterized as 
positive externalities, ecological services provided by forest fallow may be so localized 
that they occur largely within-farm and not off-site, considering the relatively large farm 
sizes that prevail in the region (40 hectares on average).  In addition, these ecological 
services may act as substitutes if on- and off-farm fallow provide similar erosion control, 
soil water regulation, and crop pollination functions locally. 
Based on the above discussion, the scientific literature supports the idea that 
localized externalities provided by forest cover may enhance agricultural productivity by 
reducing peak water flows and surface runoff, providing habitat for bees and other insect 
pollinators, and serving as a source of tree seeds.  Larger scale, regional level 
hydrological externalities are possible but are not well explained by the current state of 
research.  For the purposes of this study, I do not focus on other regional or global 
externalities provided by forest fallows or shifting cultivation, such as carbon storage, 
biodiversity habitat, or air pollution from biomass burning.   
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3 A conceptual model of shifting cultivation 
3.1 Optimal control of fallow biomass: a review 
Determining the optimal maintenance of fallow biomass presents a standard 
renewable resource problem in which the current net benefits of farming must be traded 
off against discounted future productivity.  The resource can be considered a stock of 
land quality that contributes to agricultural productivity.  Studies that consider fallow 
biomass or soil as a resource stock that evolves over time based on agricultural use and 
natural regeneration provide the starting point for this analysis. 
Beginning with McConnell’s (1983) analysis of soil management, optimal control 
models have been used to examine the conditions under which farmers augment or 
deplete the stock of land quality over time.  Models of shifting cultivation (e.g., Larson 
and Bromely 1990, Barrett 1991, Krautkraemer 1994) specify land quality regeneration 
as a function of fallow length or area.  Assuming no externalities or market failures, 
depletion of the resource stock does not necessarily imply inefficient management.  
Private and socially optimal management are not expected to diverge unless the farmer 
has a different rate of discount than society (McConnell 1983).  Farmers facing a 
nonconvex net benefit function may prefer cyclical cultivation and fallows to continuous 
farming at a steady state of soil quality (Krautkraemer 1994).  Population pressure is one 
factor that may spur shortened fallows as a form of agricultural intensification.  These 
studies do not incorporate typical developing country market failures, such as limited 
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access to employment and credit.  Romano (2003) addresses this gap, acknowledging the 
ambiguous effects of these market constraints on soil conservation4.
Managing land quality through shifting cultivation entails allocating land between 
fallow and cultivation to balance current and future productivity.  Hartwick, Long and 
Tian (2001) examine permanent land conversion from forest to cropping, where the 
equilibrium land allocation balances the marginal profit of sustainable forestry with that 
of one-off timber harvesting followed by agriculture.  When the initial stock of forested 
land exceeds the steady state level, a period of rapid land clearing ensues until the 
optimum is reached.  Ehui, Hertel and Preckel (1990) capture the land allocation tradeoff 
by modeling agricultural production as a function of the deforestation rate and the 
cumulative amount of deforested land (the former affecting yields positively, the latter 
negatively).  While the authors assume cumulative deforestation to dampen yields by 
bringing more marginal land under cultivation, this specification can also represent a loss 
of positive externalities provided by the forest stock.     
 López (1993, 1997, 1998) also confronts the land allocation problem by explicitly 
linking cultivated land area and fallow biomass density.  The fallow biomass stock is 
considered a village-level common property resource that contributes to agricultural 
productivity by providing environmental services.  In the absence of community-level 
management, individual households undervalue the shadow cost of lost biomass and 
allocate too much land to cultivation, decreasing income for the village as a whole.   
 
4 Romano’s empirical results show that El Salvadoran farmers facing market constraints increase soil 
conservation with improved access to liquidity but decrease conservation with more off-farm employment. 
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3.2 A model of shifting cultivation 
Here I extend López’s model to examine the inefficiencies that may arise in 
fallow management even under private land ownership.  When fallows are not a common 
property resource, externalities associated with forest clearing still create the scope for 
inefficient management.  Farm-level fallow biomass (θ(t)) equals the land area left fallow 
( )(txX ii − )multiplied by the average biomass density (η(t)). 
( ))()()( txXtt iiii −=ηθ
As in the biomass density growth function proposed by López (1993), a greater 
fraction of land under cultivation entails shorter fallow periods on average and hence less 
biomass accumulation because land as regularly rotated between cropping and fallow.  
Average biomass density on fallow land is thus assumed to decline with the biomass 
extracted during land clearing and increase at a constant rate (b) according to the 
following equation.        
 
By focusing on the allocation of land, this specification suppresses the length of 
cultivation and fallow cycles as a choice variable.  Instead, it sharpens the focus on the 
overall level of fallow biomass at any given time.   
While López treats the village-level stock of fallow biomass as one factor of 
production, I allow fallow biomass to boost productivity through two separate effects—
average on-farm biomass and local or village-level biomass.  These two effects capture 
the private soil-enhancing benefits and positive hydrological or other externalities of 












López (1993) establishes the proportionality between average and marginal biomass 
density, assuming a constant growth rate.  I also assume private land ownership so that 
fallow biomass is not a common property resource, but rather a private resource 
supplying externalities5.
The production function for farm i is given by  
 
where x(t) is cultivated area and lc(t) is cultivation labor.  I also introduce a choice 
variable to represent purchased inputs, such as chemical fertilizer (z(t)).  The production 
function is increasing and concave in all inputs.  A is a factor-neutral productivity shifter.  
I assume all factors to be gross complements.  Ni represents the number of farms that 
provide ecological services to farm i.  Since hydrological regulation is one externality of 
particular interest, N may include only those farms upstream of farm i but not those 
downstream or outside of the sub-watershed. Nj gives the number of farms that farm i 
affects. 
 On-farm fallow biomass has an additional productive use as a source of forest 
products that can be harvested for consumption or sale.  Forest product harvests are a 
function of harvesting labor and fallow biomass, as well as off-farm fallow if 
hydrological, pollination, or other ecological services also improve forest product yields, 
as below: 
 
I assume that the fallow product harvesting function is increasing and concave in 
labor and on- and off-farm biomass, and that these factors are all gross complements.  
Unlike crop production, I assume that no purchased inputs are used in forest product 
 




















collection and that factor-neutral productivity changes such as technology improvements 
do not boost yields.  These assumptions are borne out in the current conditions of the 
Zona Bragantina but could easily be relaxed in an extension to this analysis.  
 Cultivated land area and biomass density also increase the cost of land clearing, as 
in Dvorak’s (1992) model of shifting cultivation.  To ensure concavity of the objective 
function, I assume the clearing cost function to be linear in land area and biomass 
density.  Although land clearing is typically manual in the Zona Bragantina, I capture the 
cost with the constant parameter c since clearing labor is needed only briefly at the start 
of the season.   
 Each farm’s profits encompass the revenue from crops and products harvested 
from the forest fallow, minus the costs of land clearing, labor, and purchased inputs.  The 
price of fallow products is given by q, while p, v, and w represent output and input prices 
and the wage rate, respectively. The discount rate is given by r.  Suppressing the time 
argument, the farm profit function is   
 (1) 
If households have access to well-functioning markets, farm production is 
recursive and independent of household characteristics.  However, even when access to 
markets is imperfect, a complication I introduce later in the discussion, household 
production behavior can be represented by profit maximization rather than utility 
maximization under the assumption of fixed leisure.  Each farm household thus confronts 









































Now I turn to the conditions characterizing farmer choices under different 
institutional arrangements.  I consider five cases: centralized (or collective) fallow 
management, collective fallow management with labor market imperfections, 
decentralized fallow management, decentralized fallow management under liquidity 
constraints that affect all farmers equally, and decentralized management under unequal 
liquidity constraints.  I focus on liquidity constraints because access to purchased inputs 
has important implications for fallow maintenance.  These different scenarios of efficient 
and inefficient management highlight the conditions under which farmers expand or 
deplete the stock of fallow biomass.   
3.2.1 Case 1: Centralized or collective management of fallows 
 Under centralized or cooperative fallow management, the optimal input levels are 
determined by maximizing the sum of farm profits over the entire sub-watershed.  The 
Hamiltonian and necessary conditions for this problem are 
 
(2)   
 
(3) 
 (4)   
 (5)  





































































































































The first condition (equation (2)) states that the marginal benefit of land under 
cultivation should equal the marginal costs in terms of land clearing, foregone net 
revenue of forest products, foregone positive externalities to other farms, and the shadow 
value of the lost fallow biomass density.  Labor is allocated to equate the marginal 
benefits of harvesting forest products and cropping with the wage rate, from equations (3) 
and (4).  Purchased inputs are similarly chosen to equalize the marginal value of 
increased productivity and the price (equation (5)).  The shadow value of the biomass 
density stock evolves with the discount rate minus the marginal contribution of biomass 
density to farm profits (equation (6)).  If the initial biomass density stock exceeds the 
steady state level, then the shadow value will start out low and rise over time while the 
stock is depleted until the steady state is reached, since, as shown by Long (1979), the 
stock and costate variables tend to move in opposite directions.   
In the long run equilibrium, at which η and µ reach steady state levels, biomass 

















Xbθ . I derive the steady state comparative statics to 
infer how price and other parameters affect the level of fallow maintained by farmers6. In 
addition, by assuming other farms are also in equilibrium and taking their fallow biomass 
 
6 I rewrite the maximization problem using duality to facilitate the derivation of comparatives statics, 






















as given, I determine the effect of external fallow on the ith farmer’s land allocation and 
biomass.  Appendix A presents derivations for the comparative statics. 
Table 3.1 Comparative statics with centralized fallow management and complete markets 
 dq dr dp dA db dθj≠i dw dv 
dxi - + ? ? ? ? ? ?
dθi + - ? ? ? ? ? ?
Forest product prices have the anticipated effect, increasing fallow biomass and 
reducing cultivated land.  A higher rate of interest encourages expansion of cultivated 
area at the expense of fallow.  Marginal increases in total factor productivity and biomass 
growth rate both have ambiguous implications for the stock of biomass.  The biomass 
growth rate affects the biomass stock ambiguously because the positive direct effect may 
be outweighed by the indirect effect of a possible decrease in fallowed area.  This latter 
point is of particular interest for the Brazilian Amazon, where “enriched fallow”—
seeding fallowed land with leguminous and fast-growing trees to speed soil recovery—is 
a new technology being disseminated to boost farm productivity.     
Cultivated land and fallow also respond to changes in the fallow biomass 
maintained on neighboring farms.  This response depends on the relative strengths of the 
externalities contributed to forest product harvesting and crop production.  If forest 
product externalities are sufficiently greater than crop production externalities, farm i 
increases the land under fallow, taking advantage of the additional productivity.  If crop 
production externalities dominate, the opposite occurs.      
 












































Increases in the wage rate also affect land allocation ambiguously.  If the marginal 
productivity of land used in forest product harvesting exceeds that used in cultivation, a 
wage increase draws labor out of farm production, dampening the pressure to expand 
cultivation and exploit biomass.  The reverse may be true if labor has a higher marginal 
productivity in crop production.  These results depend on the existence of perfect labor 
markets, an assumption I relax in the next section. 
Increases in the crop output price, factor productivity parameter, and input price 
also have unclear effects on fallow management without further knowledge about the 
crop production functional form.  I assume a Cobb-Douglas technology for both crops 
and forest products in the remainder of the analysis to draw further intuition about the 
potential effects of various parameters on fallow management.   
Under the Cobb-Douglas assumption, higher crop output prices and increased 
factor productivity cause an expansion in cultivated area and a contraction of the biomass 
stock.  Similarly, increases in purchased input prices cause a contraction in the cultivated 
area and an expansion of fallow because the marginal cost of forest product harvesting 
remains the same, while that of cultivation rises.  Note that even without the Cobb-
Douglas assumption, this result still holds if purchased inputs complement cultivated land 
more strongly than fallow.       
Input prices can also incorporate effectiveness, representing the per-unit cost of 
productivity enhancement.  A drop in effectiveness is equivalent to a price increase, 
resulting in lower cultivated land and higher fallow biomass.  Variations in the 
effectiveness of inputs such as fertilizer over space may thus lead to different levels of 
biomass exploitation.   
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Table 3.2 Comparative statics with centralized fallow management and complete markets (Cobb-
Douglas production) 
 dp dA dv 
dxi + + -
dθi - - +
3.2.2 Case 3: Decentralized management of fallows 
In the absence of any central coordination, farmers have no incentive to weigh 
foregone externalities as a cost when allocating land between cultivation and fallow.  The 
necessary conditions for profit maximization when farmers fail to internalize the biomass 








These conditions correspond to the Nash equilibrium solution for the choice of 
cultivated land, labor, fertilizer, and biomass density.  The marginal value of the biomass 
externality is not weighed in the land allocation decision or in the evolution of the 
biomass shadow value.  Disregarding the externality, farmers prefer to expand the area 
under cultivation.  Farmer welfare under these conditions is necessarily lower due to 
underprovision of the biomass externality.     
Policies to spur an efficient allocation of land between cultivation and fallow 
include a tax on cultivated land or a subsidy on fallowed land, as well as a subsidy on 
forest products.  In the following cases, I examine second-best options to curtail fallow 
















































































biomass exploitation, potentially raising the level of social welfare relative to the case of 
decentralized management under perfect markets.      
3.2.3 Case 3: Decentralized fallow management with liquidity 
constraints 
Now I consider a situation in which farmers do not coordinate fallow management 
but are constrained in their use of purchased inputs by a limited cash budget comprised of 
credit and off-farm wage income.  I introduce a labor market restriction to capture the 
limited off-farm employment opportunities typical of rural developing country settings.  
Wage labor is positive when family members work off-farm, but it cannot exceed the 
employment constraint M.  Negative wage labor implies that labor is hired in for 
agricultural activities, as may be the case during peak periods such as harvesting.  I use 
the equality MllL ch ++= , where L represents the household’s labor endowment, 






















































































































The liquidity constraint for input purchases is given by vzwMR =+ , where R 
represents access to credit, wM is cash income from off-farm employment (or 
expenditures for hired labor if M is negative), and λ is the shadow value of loosening this 
constraint.  If the liquidity constraint is nonbinding, the first order conditions mimic those 
in case 2.  If the constraint is binding, purchased inputs are underused relative to the 
privately optimal amount such that     .    . 
Assuming Cobb-Douglas technology, comparative static results are similar to 
those from case 1, except for the effects of the off-farm wage rate and the credit 
parameter R.  The effect of the off-farm employment constraint is ambiguous because it 
is not clear whether decreases in fallow or cropped area productivity dominate following 
decreases in cultivation and harvesting labor.  However, the off-farm wage rate has a 
different effect on production decisions than does the labor constraint.  Since the wage 
rate does not directly determine labor allocation decisions, it affects production only 
through the liquidity constraint.  A higher wage rate thus leads to increased input use and 
cultivated area and diminished fallow biomass.  Unsurprisingly, increased credit also 
causes expansion of cultivated area and contraction of the fallow biomass as farmers 
expand crop production at the expense of fallow area.   
Table 3.3 Comparative statics with decentralized fallow management and incomplete labor and 
credit markets (Cobb-Douglas production)  
 dM dw dR 
dxi ? + +
dθi ? - -
These results provide the basis for considering liquidity constraints a second best 
policy to minimize inefficiencies caused by decentralized fallow management.  I further 






Differentiating the Lagrangian representing social welfare, which is simply the sum of 
profits over all farms in the sub-watershed, and using the envelope theorem to drop those 
terms equal to zero according to the necessary conditions for individual profit 
maximization yields the following expression 







































This expression illustrates the ambiguous effect of improved credit access for 
community-level income.  The first two terms are negative and represent the marginal 
value of the lost externality caused by a slackening of the constraint.  The final term is 
positive and denotes the marginal value of increased input use due to improved credit 
access.  As the constraint slackens, the marginal value of additional inputs approaches 
zero, while the marginal value of the lost externality remains negative.  Thus, although 
this expression cannot be signed definitively, I expect the first two terms to dominate 
when the constraint is relatively relaxed.  This result implies that a credit constraint, if not 
too severe, can improve welfare when fallow management is decentralized.   
Note that these results are driven by the assumption of productive local 
externalities to forest fallow.  If these externalities are not economically significant, then 
both centralized and decentralized management of fallows will be efficient and liquidity 
constraints and transportation costs will necessarily decrease welfare.  Constrained input 
use or decreased marginal output value in this case leads to underexploitation of the 
fallow biomass relative to efficient use. While fallow biomass may still provide regional 
or global public goods, such as carbon storage, it is not privately or collectively optimal 
for farmers to internalize this cost.   
32
3.2.4 Case 4: Decentralized fallow management with uneven liquidity 
constraints 
Here I consider an unevenly applied liquidity constraint. In other words, R + wM 
is binding for only a subset of farmers.  The unconstrained farmers’ choices are made 
according to the conditions given in case 2, while liquidity-constrained farmers’ decisions 
follow the conditions described in case 3.     
As in case 3, the liquidity constraint causes some farmers to limit their 
exploitation of fallow biomass as they cultivate less land due to purchased input 
shortfalls.  Unconstrained farmers choose their land allocations and input use while 
ignoring the costs of the foregone positive externalities to other farms from fallowing.  
Hence, their cultivated land area is greater than is socially optimal, while fallow biomass 
is overexploited.  This lower level of fallow biomass reduces constrained farmers’ profits.  
However, unconstrained farmers are not necessarily worse off than they would be under 
the efficient management regime described in case 1, thanks to the higher level of 
biomass maintained by constrained farmers.  In the extreme case in which a liquidity 
constraint forces all other farmers in the locality to maintain the socially efficient level of 
biomass, the unconstrained farmer’s profits are actually higher than they would be under 
collective or central fallow management.   
While unconstrained farmers reap most of the benefits of the liquidity constraint, 
constrained farmer welfare may actually improve as well if the subset of constrained 
farmers is large enough to increase the local biomass stock.  This result is similar to the 
ambiguous effects of inequality on common property resource management efficiency 
found by Baland and Plateau (1997, 1998).  In their study, unequal credit constraints may 
lead to increased efficiency under unregulated commons, though in their fisheries 
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example the unconstrained agents, who garner a larger share of the profits, internalize a 
larger portion of the externality.  This type of result may ensue for fallow management if 
credit access increases with land endowment.  However, ranking the welfare of 
aggregate, constrained, and unconstrained farmers under the different scenarios is 
difficult without assuming specific parameter values for the size of the liquidity 
constraint and the numbers of constrained and unconstrained farmers. 
As seen in the comparative static results from case 1, farmers’ choices of 
cultivated land and fallow biomass vary with the fallow on nearby farms, though the 
direction of the effect is ambiguous.  Therefore, farmers may choose the level of 
cultivated land and fallow strategically, anticipating neighboring farms’ fallow 
management.  If the crop production externality dominates the forest product externality, 
farmers will decrease their own fallow biomass to take advantage of their neighbors’.  
This behavior will exacerbate the effects of unequal liquidity, causing constrained 
farmers to conserve more fallow in response to the overexploitation of unconstrained 
farmers, and vice versa.  However, if the forest product externality is more important, 
then strategic behavior may raise social welfare by spurring both constrained and 
unconstrained farmers to set aside more land to fallow. 
These stylized scenarios illustrate the importance of institutional conditions, as 
well as prices and ecological parameters, on the exploitation of fallow even under secure 
property rights.  Cases 3 and 4 present plausible, though obviously simplified, scenarios 
to explain the persistence of fallow under conditions like those found in the Zona 
Bragantina, where farmers have some access to land and labor markets but may 
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underexploit fallow biomass relative to the privately optimal level due to liquidity 
constraints limiting the use of soil-enhancing inputs.   
By using a continuous model to represent shifting cultivation dynamics, my 
results do not capture the adjustment costs inherent in a shift to a longer fallow period.  
Since biomass accumulates gradually, the gains in productivity from a longer fallow will 
take up to a full cycle to materialize.  In the meantime, the reduced income from 
cultivating a smaller area is costly in the short-term.  Thus, even if parameter changes 
favor increases in fallow length and reductions in cultivated area, the adjustment costs 
may be prohibitive.   
In the following chapters, I confront the empirical issues raised in this discussion.  
In Chapter 4, I estimate production functions with data from the Eastern Amazon’s Zona 
Bragantina to determine the magnitude of the returns to fallowing in shifting cultivation 
and forest product harvesting, both private and public.  I test whether fallow biomass 
provides economically significant externalities to farm production, which will better 
enable me to evaluate the implications of potential market failures for fallow 
management.   
I examine whether farmers behave strategically in response to their neighbors’ 
land use in Chapter 5.  The theory predicts the direction of the effect to be ambiguous; 
however, the dominance of crop production in the Zona Bragantina suggests that farms 
may be likely to reduce their on-farm fallow in response to additional fallow land on their 
neighbors’ farms, leading to negative spatial correlation in fallow.  I estimate the effect of 
neighbors’ fallow on on-farm fallow area using a spatial econometric model.  The 
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coefficient on the spatial lag of fallow indicates whether farmers respond to their 
neighbors land use.   
I then test the hypothesis that liquidity constraints affect fallow management in 
Chapter 6.  Fallow management under limited access to liquidity or markets in the 
presence of externalities may entail underexploitation of the fallow biomass relative to 
the private but not necessarily social optimum.  Thus, the coexistence of market failures 
and externalities opens the possibility that the underexploitation of fallow by constrained 
farmers may lead to greater social welfare.   
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4 Empirical analysis: valuing forest fallow resources 
and externalities in shifting cultivation  
4.1 Data  
Data were collected as part of the SHIFT (Studies on Human Impact on Forests 
and Floodplains in the Tropics) project, an initiative to study tropical livelihoods and 
ecosystem dynamics in Brazil.  Three municipios out of the 14 that comprise the Zona 
Bragantina were chosen for study to capture regional variation in distance to commercial 
centers, agricultural intensification, and rainfall (Mendoza 2004).  In late 2002, 271 
households in 22 villages were randomly selected and surveyed.   




Farm size (ha) 40.73  
(47.97)         
271 
Household size (members) 6.18  
(2.78) 
271 
Own farmland (legal title) 




Household head education 
(years) 
3.77     
(2.91)           
271 
Use extension services  
1 = yes, 0 = no 
0.24     
(0.43)           
271  
Use of commercial credit (from 
bank or cooperative) 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
0.31     
(0.46) 
271 
Own car  














Own firewood stove 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
0.85     
(0.36)           
271 
Own gas stove 
1 = yes, 0 = no 




The survey collected information on demographics, on- and off-farm income, 
farm and household assets, commercial credit use, and land use, including area under 
cultivation, pasture, and fallow.  Table 4.1 presents the mean values for selected 
household-level characteristics.   
Most of the households are considered smallholders by Brazilian standards, with 
mean landholdings of 40 hectares7. Close to two-thirds of farmers hold legal title to their 
land.  Despite secure land tenure as an asset, only 31% of farms received credit from a 
commercial bank or agricultural cooperative during the past decade.  Sixty-two percent of 
farms use electricity, indicating a lack of access to infrastructure by some households.    
Sampled households are poor even for Pará, earning B$1625 per capita annually, 
compared to the state average of B$3804 (Verner 2004).  Close to two-thirds of income is 
earned from farm activities, while 37% comes from off-farm sources.  Old-age pensions 
comprise the bulk of off-farm earnings and are received by 39% of households.  Annual 
crops, produced by 90% of the farmers, dominate farm activities, contributing 54% to 
farm income on average.  Perennial crops are produced by 46% of households and make 
up 24% of farm income.  The remainder of farm income includes forest product harvests 
(14%) and animal products such as eggs, dairy products, and meat (8%).  Most farms are 
semi-commercialized, retaining some produce for home consumption and selling the 
remainder in regional markets.  Farmers sell 65% of perennial and horticultural output, 
while only marketing 40% of the staple food crops cassava, maize, rice, and beans and 
26% of forest products.  Table 4.2 reports mean values for each type of output and 
income source, and Table 4.3 presents output and input prices in the region. 
 
7 Ninety-four percent of the farmers’ landholdings are 100 hectares or less, the common definition for 
smallholders in Brazil. 
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Total income ($B8) 8666 
(13280) 
271 
Annual crop income ($B) 2255 
(3751) 
271 
Perennial crop income ($B) 2826 
(10783) 
271 
Produce perennial crops 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
0.46     
(0.50)           
271 
Forest product value ($B) 
 
666.94     
(3206.31)           
271 
Harvest fallow products 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
0.69  
(0.46)           
271 
Animal product income ($B) 267 
(1017) 
271 
Off-farm income ($B)—agricultural and non-
agricultural wage 
1040.04     
(2112.50)           
271 
Off-farm income ($B)—scholarships and 
remittances 
117       
(336)           
271 
Off-farm income ($B)—pensions 1494     
(4009) 
271 
Farms with wage income 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
0.52     
(0.50) 
271 
Farms with non-wage income 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
0.56     
(0.50) 
271 




Village-level annual price index ($B/kg) 0.81 
(0.23) 
271 
Village-level perennial price index ($B/kg) 3.26 
(1.81) 
271 
Forest product price ($B/kg)9 6.57     
(14.76) 
187 
Village-level fertilizer price index ($B/kg) 0.93 
(0.10) 
271 
Agricultural wage rate ($B/day) 8.26     
(1.38)           
271 
Transportation cost ($B/kg) 0.01     
(0.01)           
271 
Transportation frequency  3.86     271 
8 US$1 = $B 2.97, 2002 average 
9 I impute forest product prices for households that do not collect forest products using village averages.   
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1 = 1x/week, 2 = 2x/week, 3 = 3x/week, 4 = 
1x/day, 5 = >1x/day 
(1.37)           
Distance from household to market (km) 23.68     
(12.41) 
252 
Comprehensive farm-level data on forest fallow for the entire Zona Bragantina 
would be ideal to estimate the off-site flow of benefits and their spatial scale but are 
unavailable.  I make use of the household survey data on land use among the sampled 
farms as one solution.  As an additional approach to address this gap, I turn to GIS 
(geographic information systems) data on forest cover, using the MODIS Vegetation 
Continuous Fields (VCF) to construct an alternative measure of external fallow.  The 
VCF data consist of 25 hectare (0.25 km2) resolution pixels created using 40 day 
composite satellite images from March 2001-March 2002 (Hansen et al. 2003)10. Each 
pixel represents percent canopy cover, defined as the amount of sunlight blocked by tree 
canopies over five meters high.  Figure 2 gives 2001-02 tree canopy cover for the Zona 
Bragantina.   
 
10 The 2001-02 VCF data provide the closest available estimates of forest cover during the 2001-2002 
cropping season.  Twenty-five hectare pixels are a sufficiently fine measure of tree cover relative to the size 
of landholdings among the surveyed farmers, as the median farm size is also 25 hectares.  The percent 
canopy cover approximates both the area and density of forest cover, since the share of land with five- 
meter tree cover is likely to be highly correlated with vegetation density. 
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Figure 2 Tree canopy cover in the Zona Bragantina, March 2001-March 2002 
0 30 6015 Kilometers
Source: Hansen, DeFries, Townshend, et al. 2003 
 
I also use GIS flow direction data from the US Geological Survey to determine 
where farms lie along a gradient from upstream to downstream in relation to one another. 
Knowledge of farms’ relative positions within the sub-watershed is essential for defining 
the upstream forest cover variables.  According to a flow direction map for the region 
(Figure 3), farms cluster into 11 groups defined by a common drainage area and flow 
direction.  Each cluster includes at least one sampled community.  Within each group, I 
assume observations affect farms downstream and are affected by farms upstream.  I 
discuss the construction of the external forest fallow variable further later in the chapter.  











Figure 3 Flow direction in the Zona Bragantina 
0 30 6015 Kilometers
Source: U.S. Geological Survey  
4.2 Empirical approach 
 My approach to valuing the services provided by on-farm and off-site forest 
fallow involves estimating production functions for two primary activities in the Zona 
Bragantina: crop production and forest product harvesting11. The surveyed farmers 
produced a total of 50 annual and perennial crops, with cassava, maize, beans, and black 
pepper among the most common.  Collecting forest products makes a modest 
contribution to income relative to cropping but is practiced widely among the surveyed 
farms.  The production function estimations allow me to measure the contribution of on- 
and off-farm fallow to productive activities and test for positive externalities to fallowing 
in each.  I also calculate the contribution of fallow resources to total farm income by 
aggregating the respective contributions of on-farm and upstream fallow to cultivation 











address issues of measurement error, omitted variables, and simultaneity, which I discuss 
below.  I also account for potential spatial dependence in the error terms of these 
equations by estimating spatially-correlated error models.   
4.3 Crop production function  
The dependent variable in the crop production function is the log of crop output 
value, with different commodities aggregated using average output prices in the region.  
Although farms commonly reserve some crops for home consumption in the region, 
market prices provide appropriate values for these commodities since 97% of sampled 
farmers sell at least some of their produce.  I employ a Cobb-Douglas specification for 
cropping technology.  Output is modeled as a function of cultivated land area, family and 
hired labor, fertilizer, on-farm fallow area, and off-farm (upstream) fallow area.  Because 
farm products are marketed goods, valuation of the fallow ecological services using a 
production function approach is straightforward and does not depend on detailed 
knowledge of the ecological mechanisms at work (Maler 1991).  The crop value equation 











In this specification, yi represents the ith farm’s crop value. Fallow area is 
represented by fi, while F is a vector of all farms’ fallow area.  Cultivated land area, 
family and hired labor, and fertilizer are represented by Xi, a vector of conventional 
inputs.   
 
11 Ranching and livestock products make up the remainder of agricultural activities.  Ranching is less 
common in the Zona Bragantina than either cropping or forest product collection.  Pasture is found on only 
28% of farms, comprising 5% of farm land on average among the entire sample.   
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The error term is given by εi, which includes a component that varies over space 
and a white noise term, ui. A spatial autoregressive model accounts for the fact that 
unobserved variables subsumed by the error term may be correlated based on distance 
between households, allowing for efficient estimation of the parameters (Dubin 1998).  
The strength of the spatial correlation among the disturbances is represented by λ.
Spatial weighting matrices for off-farm fallow and the error term are represented 
by W1 and W2, respectively. W1 gives equal weight to neighbors upstream of each farm to 
capture the hydrological externalities of local forest fallow.  Although row normalization 
is not appropriate in all spatial analyses, normalizing by the number of sampled farms in 
each farm’s neighborhood is important in this case to avoid inferring that farms with 
more sampled neighbors have higher levels of nearby forest cover.  Thus, W1 ln F
represents a weighted average of off-farm fallow area upstream of each observation.  I 
also refer to this term as a spatial lag of the fallow variable.12 
W2 is a matrix of inverse distances between all sampled farms, reflecting 
correlation in unobserved factors expected to decline with distance, such as weather 
shocks.  W2 is not row normalized, as row normalization would imply that more isolated 
farms are affected by their neighbors’ disturbances as much as farms with many 
neighbors in close proximity.  The uniqueness of the two proposed spatial weighting 
matrices is thus justified conceptually, and it ensures that the spatial autoregressive 
 
12Following the convention used by Anselin (1988) and others, I use the term spatial lag to mean a 
weighted sum of neighboring or contiguous values of the variable of interest, somewhat analogous to the 
concept of temporally-lagged variables in time-series analysis.  Since the data vary only over space, not 
time, no temporal lags are used in any of the analyses in this paper.   Spatial lag models generally refer to 
spatial correlation in the dependent variable, while spatial error models account for spatial autoregressive 
processes in the disturbance.   
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parameters can be identified13. However, if spatial correlation among the disturbances 
does in fact follow the same pattern as the hypothesized hydrological externality, then the 
two effects cannot be disentangled without further parameter restrictions.   
I include household and farm characteristics in the vector Hi to control for 
observable aspects of management ability and land quality.  The household head’s 
schooling years and binary variables indicating use of extension services and land 
ownership may help control for farmer management skills14. A binary variable for 
perennial crop production controls for the higher prices perennial crops command in 
regional markets relative to annual crops15. Land quality indicators include farmer-
reported dummy variables for black clay and charcoal-enriched soil (“massape” and 
“preta,” both favorable types) and poor soil (“arisca”) and GIS data on slope, which 
indicates the farm’s vulnerability to erosion.  While soil is fairly homogenous throughout 
the region and land is not steeply sloped, these variables help account for micro-level 
agroecological variation.  However, they do not adequately indicate land-use history, a 
major determinant of soil quality in the region (Tucker et al. 1998).  The equation also 
includes municipality dummies.  Table 4.4 reports the mean values for the variables used 
in the production function estimation. 
 
13 As shown by Anselin 1988 (pp. 84-85), spatial lag and spatial error parameters are generally not 
identified without nonlinear restrictions when the two weighting matrices are the same. 
14 I also included the log of the household head’s age in an early regression but dropped it in subsequent 
analyses because of missing observations and lack of significance. Inclusion of this variable did not 
qualitatively affect the other parameter estimates.   
15 In a preliminary attempt to control for the potential endogeneity of producing perennial crops, I estimated 
a treatment effects model.  I could not reject they hypothesis that the crop output and perennial production 
equations are independent (p = 0.86-0.88, depending on the measure of off-farm fallow used), so I treat 
perennial production as exogenous in the regressions that follow.  Perennial crops can be grown in soil 
conditions found throughout the Zona Bragantina.  However, farmers with facing higher rainfall, better 
access to extension services, and those less averse to price risks are more likely to produce perennials 
(Borner 2005).  
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The primary parameters of interest are the coefficients of on-farm fallow and 
external fallow.  The coefficients of on-farm and external fallow give the respective 
output elasticities, indicating the contribution of these fixed environmental factors to crop 
production.  I tackle the hypothesis that local forest cover provides positive externalities 
to downstream farms by testing whether the coefficient of the spatially-weighted external 
forest fallow variable is significantly greater than zero.     




Crop output value ($B) 5118.27     
(11972.62)           
261 
Cultivated area (ha) 3.75      
(4.64)           
270 
Family labor (person-days) 112.47     
(97.42)           
271 
No family labor used  




Hired labor (person-days) 52.94      
(75.36)           
271 
No hired labor used 




Fertilizer (kg NPK) 389.90     
(1525.69)           
271 
No fertilizer used 




On-farm fallow area (ha)  22.60     
(28.97)           
271 
No on-farm fallow land 




Off-farm (upstream) average 
fallow area – survey data 
(ha/upstream neighbor) 
24.54    
(19.62) 
236 
No upstream fallow area 




Off-farm (upstream) canopy 
cover – GIS data, 3km radius 
(% area) 
30.10     
(6.23)          
261 
No upstream canopy cover  




Slope (degrees) 2.65     261 
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(2.54)           
Black clay (massape) soil 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
0.10     
(0.30)           
271 
Charcoal enriched (preta) soil 
1 = yes, 0 = no  
0.10     
(0.31) 
271 
Poor (arisca) soil 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
0.06     
(0.24)           
271 
4.3.1 Fallow variable definitions 
I use area under fallow during the cropping season as a proxy for fallow biomass.  
While fallow area does not directly measure biomass or capture the dynamic aspects of 
fallowing, larger fallow relative to cultivated area allows for more forest recovery time 
and higher peak biomass density16. Fallow area has the additional advantage of proxying 
for any flows of hydrological or crop pollination services provided by forest fallow 
within the farm.   
As mentioned previously, I employ two alternative measures of off-farm fallow.  I 
define a variable using the household survey data to measure the average area under 
forest fallow upstream of each farm, using the spatial weighting matrix W1 to define 
which farms are considered neighbors.  I also generate a GIS fallow variable using the 
VCF data measuring percent canopy cover, again using each farm’s location to determine 
the upstream forest area to extract.    
I define the externality-relevant neighborhood for each household based on the 
scale and direction of forest ecosystem services discussed in the ecological literature.  
Hydrological research suggests that regulation of soil water and flooding by forests is 
 
16 In the biomass density growth function proposed by López (1993) and used in the theoretical model in 
Chapter 3, a smaller fraction of land under cultivation entails longer fallow periods on average and hence 
more biomass accumulation because land is regularly rotated between cropping and fallow.  When fallow 
management is in steady state equilibrium, fallow area has a direct relationship with biomass volume, 
though the relationship is still positive when the system is out of equilibrium.  The steady state assumption 
may be plausible in the conditions of the Zona Bragantina, where current agronomic practices have been 
largely in place and minimal migration has occurred for the past several decades, in contrast to much of the 
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quite localized; larger-scale forest externalities are possible but remain understudied 
(Bruijnzeel 2004).  Crop pollination services also occur on a small scale of 1-3km 
(Ricketts et al. 2004, Kremen et al. 2004).   
For the survey-derived fallow area variable, I count every observation upstream of 
a farm within a common drainage area as a neighbor, using flow direction data to 
determine the relative positions of farms.  Those farms furthest upstream within a locality 
are thus assumed to affect all downstream farms; however, they have no neighbors 
among the sampled farms and so must be excluded from the final crop value equation 
testing for externalities.  Figure 4 illustrates the geographic structure of the relationship.  
Land use on farm 1 affects all farms downstream, but I have no information on land use 
upstream of farm 1.  Meanwhile, farm 8 is affected by land use on farms 1-7 in its 
position as the farthest observation downstream.     
Figure 4 Flow direction of hypothesized hydrological externalities 
 
Using the GIS canopy cover data, I cannot extract upstream forest cover within 
each drainage area individually for each farm, so I instead extract a wedge-shaped 
 












neighborhood upstream of each farm with a radius of 3 km.  As expected, the survey- and 
GIS-derived variables are positively correlated at the 3-km radius scale (rho = 0.42).   
Deriving the off-farm fallow variable using the survey data ensures that on- and 
off-farm fallow are measured the same way and prevents overlap between the two 
variables, both attractive features.  This variable represents upstream forest cover 
accurately if the sampled farms are representative of other farms within the same 
neighborhood.  Conversely, the GIS canopy cover data offers the advantage of covering 
the Zona Bragantina region comprehensively rather than being limited by the survey 
sample size.  It can also measure upstream forest cover data for all farms for which I have 
GIS coordinates, while the survey data gives no information about upstream land use for 
farms with no upstream neighbors among sample17. However, the GIS variable cannot 
avoid some overlap with the on-farm fallow variable even though I exclude the pixel 
matching the farm’s location, since data on the exact mapped boundaries of each farm are 
unavailable18. In addition, canopy cover proxies for fallow biomass as well as area, so 
this variable may be correlated with on-farm biomass.  With these drawbacks in mind, I 
use both measures in my analysis to enhance the robustness of the results. Both 
approaches define the externality at the farm level, allowing for more variation in the off-
farm forest cover variable compared to other studies that define the forest externality at 
the village or sub-watershed level (e.g., López 1993, 1997, 1998; Pattanayak and Kramer 
2001; Pattanayak and Butry 2005).   
 
fallow area as alternative measures in Ghana.          
17 GIS coordinates are missing for 10 farms in the sample, which are excluded from the analysis. In 
addition, 35 farms (13% of the sample) have no upstream neighbors as defined using the household survey 
data and are excluded from regressions that incorporate this variable.   
18 To avoid counting farms as their own neighbors, I exclude the farm from the calculation of the household 
survey-derived off-farm fallow variable, and I exclude the pixel most closely matching the farm’s location 
from the GIS forest cover variable.   
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4.3.2 Econometric issues 
Several potential sources of endogeneity are causes of concern in obtaining 
consistent estimates of the parameters of interest.  Factors such as land quality and farm 
management ability cannot be fully controlled for and may be correlated with yield and 
fallowing practices, as well as other inputs, causing omitted variable bias.  In particular, 
poor soil quality may spur farmers to allocate more land to fallow while also depressing 
yields, biasing the on-farm fallow coefficient downward.  Soil quality may be spatially 
correlated, leading to a possible downward bias on the external forest fallow coefficient 
as well.   
Measurement error of fallow variables, which proxy for but do not exactly 
measure fallow biomass, may cause attenuation bias, further lowering the elasticity 
estimates (Greene 2000).  In addition, differing measurement error between the on-farm 
fallow area and off-farm GIS canopy cover variable may also be a source of bias due to 
the different data sources used to construct them.  The GIS canopy cover data indicates 
fallow biomass density as well as area, while the on-farm fallow measure only 
incorporates fallow area (though as mentioned previously, fallow area and biomass are 
likely to be correlated).  Thus, the coefficient of on-farm fallow may be biased downward 
and the coefficient of GIS canopy cover upward if external canopy cover is correlated 
with on-farm biomass density.  However, the survey-reported data on off-farm fallow 
area avoids this source of bias.   
Finally, the coefficients of cultivated area, labor, fertilizer, and on-farm fallow 
may be biased upward if the farmer chooses input and output levels simultaneously.  Off-
farm fallow is less likely to be vulnerable to simultaneity problems since the farmer does 
not determine fallow levels on neighboring farms, though it may still be affected by 
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climatic shocks experienced by all farms within a neighborhood.  The error term in the 
production equation thus encompasses not only white noise, but also measurement error, 
agroecological conditions, farmer intentions, and other factors that are unaccounted for in 
the data.   
4.3.3 Identification strategy and instrumental variables approach 
While I cannot cleanly solve the identification problem with the data at hand, I 
employ several strategies in an effort to consistently estimate the parameters of interest.  
As discussed above, I include several observed indicators of land quality and 
management ability, including slope, farmer-reported soil types, use of extension 
services, and the household head’s education level.  Modeling spatial correlation in the 
error terms based on distance between farms also helps control for unobserved patterns in 
agroclimatic factors and farmer knowledge over space19. Finally, I use an instrumental 
variables (IV) estimator to address potential remaining omitted variables and 
measurement error issues. 
To address the endogeneity of on- and off-farm fallow using IV, I need at least 
two instruments highly correlated with these factors but uncorrelated with the residual of 
the crop output equation.  As discussed by Heckman (1991), the effects of past 
experiences or decisions on outcomes can be hard to disentangle from underlying 
heterogeneity, making identification of truly exogenous variables challenging, if not 
impossible.  I use the log of farm size, forest product prices, and binary variables 
 
19 Mardia and Marshall (1984) show that the maximum likelihood estimator of the spatial error model is 
consistent if the domain or observation area of the data increases as the sample size increases (domain 
asymptotics).  The consistency of the maximum likelihood estimator has not been shown when the sample 
size increases under a fixed domain, causing an increase in the density of observations within the given 
region (infill asymptotics) (Cressie 1993).  Therefore, consistency of the spatial errors estimators discussed 
in this paper applies only under increasing domain asymptotics.   
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indicating ownership of a firewood stove and ownership of a gas stove to instrument for 
on-farm fallow.  Farm size affects the amount of land available for fallowing and so is 
likely to be a strong predictor of fallow area.  In addition, farm size has no direct effect 
on crop output because cultivated land area, clearly a crucial factor of production, is 
included directly in the production function, making total farm area unrelated to crop 
value and hence a valid instrument.  I expect forest product prices and firewood stove 
ownership to be positively correlated with on-farm fallow since fallow land typically 
serves as a source of forest products for sale or home consumption, with firewood the 
most common product.  Conversely, gas stove ownership may negatively affect on-farm 
fallow by decreasing the household’s dependence on firewood fuel.  Forest-product price 
is a good instrument because it is unlikely to be correlated with unobservable factors 
affecting crop output mix and yields despite its impact on the marginal returns to fallow 
area.  Firewood and gas stove ownership have similar advantages as instruments unless 
farmers invest in stoves based on their planned allocation of land to fallow.   
To instrument for off-farm fallow, I use the spatially-lagged values of the on-farm 
fallow instruments and of other household-level exogenous variables included in the crop 
production equation.  Thus, the instruments include the spatial lags of the log of farm 
size, forest product prices, firewood and gas stove ownership, and other household and 
agroecological characteristics expected to affect crop production.  The spatially-lagged 
values of farm and household characteristics affect neighbors’ land allocation decisions 
and hence off-farm fallow but are uncorrelated with the residual of own-farm output 
because own-farm characteristics are controlled for directly in the production function20.
20 I also tested the exogeneity of all inputs jointly, including cultivated area, labor, and fertilizer.  I added 
the log of family size and the share of males age 16-65 as instruments in this regression.  I could not reject 
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I do not use the spatially-lagged values of conventional inputs or the perennial production 
indicator due to concerns about the potential endogeneity of these variables.  I use the 
same spatial weighting matrix to construct the instrumental variables as that used to 
construct the lagged fallow variables to ensure that neighbors’ fallow area is regressed on 
the characteristics of these same neighbors.  While this strategy may fall short of 
approaches that use experimental or panel data to identify the parameters of interest, it 
still has potential to shed some light on the relationship between fallow biomass and 
agricultural productivity.   
The IV approach performs well, as the instruments are both strong predictors of 
on- and off-farm fallow and are uncorrelated with crop value.  First-stage regressions for 
the on- and off-farm fallow variables are presented in the Appendix (Table B1).  The 
exogenous variables explain a high proportion of the variation in on-farm fallow, 
upstream fallow area, and upstream canopy cover as indicated by R-squared statistics of 
0.74-0.75, 0.91, and 0.76, respectively.  The log of farm size is very highly correlated 
with on-farm fallow across both specifications (p = 0.00).  Forest product prices also 
significantly predict on-farm fallow (p = 0.05) in one of the first-stage equations for on-
farm fallow (column 3).  Spatially-lagged values of farm size, forest product price, gas- 
and firewood-stove ownership, and black clay soil have strong effects on upstream fallow 
area (column 2).  Similarly, lagged log farm size, firewood stove ownership, use of 
extension services, farm ownership, charcoal-enriched soil, and slope help explain GIS 
canopy cover within a 3-km upstream radius of each farm (column 4).  
 
exogeneity of all inputs jointly (p = 0.76-0.96, depending on the off-farm fallow variable).  In the 
remaining discussion, I focus on controlling for endogeneity of the fallow variables. 
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The Sargan test for overidentification indicates that the instrumental variables as a 
group are uncorrelated with the residuals of the output equations21. I also checked the 
validity of the instruments individually by including each one-by-one in the IV estimation 
of crop value (Table B2).  None were significant at conventional levels.  The p-values for 
the log of farm size, forest product price, firewood-stove ownership and gas-stove 
ownership ranged from 0.21-0.94, and p-values for the spatially-lagged variables ranged 
from 0.16-0.99 across both models.   
While the IV estimates are consistent, a Hausman test could not reject exogeneity 
of the on- and off-farm fallow variables, whether using the survey or GIS measures of 
off-farm fallow (p= 0.55-0.87).  Thus, the least squares estimates of the elasticities of on- 
and off-farm fallow are both consistent and more efficient than the IV estimates.   
4.3.4 Treatment of non-essential inputs   
Use of the Cobb-Douglas specification implies that all inputs are used in positive 
quantities.  However, some farmers in the sample use no fertilizer, hired labor, or fallow 
land, and a few have no upstream forest cover according to the household survey data 
(Table 4.4).  I do not employ the widely-used strategy of adding a small shifter to the 
inputs before taking logs because parameter estimates tend to be highly sensitive to the 
value of the shifter (Soloaga 2000).  Instead, I deal with non-essential inputs according to 
the approach outlined by Battese (1997), adding dummy variables to indicate non-use of 
each input22. In addition, ten farms produce no outputs during the season and are 
excluded from the crop production equation.   
 
21 IV validity tests were carried out assuming uncorrelated (non-spatial) disturbances.  
22 Battese represents a two-input Cobb-Douglas production technology using two equations, assuming that 
one input, x1, is used by all firms, and a second input, x2, is used by only some firms: 
ln y = b0 + b1*ln x1 + b2*ln x2 + u, for all farms with x2>0 
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4.3.5 Results  
Table 4.5 presents four sets of estimates of the crop production function.  The first 
two columns report estimates from the spatial error model (SEM) (1) and from the spatial 
error model with instrumental variables (SEM-IV) (2) using survey-reported off-farm 
fallow area to represent upstream fallow.  The last two columns show SEM (3) and SEM-
IV (4) estimates with the GIS canopy cover variable as an alternative measure of 
upstream fallow.  As stated above, the on- and off-farm fallow variables can be 
considered exogenous, so all four sets of elasticity estimates are consistent.  All models 
have a satisfactory fit, as indicated by R-squared statistics of 0.56-0.60, and the 
coefficients largely have the expected signs across the different models.  The spatial error 
correlation coefficient is not significantly different from zero in any of the specifications, 
indicating that unobserved variables varying with distance between farms have no 
systematic effect on crop output. 
Comparisons among the four models reveal that on-farm and upstream fallow are 
both important factors of crop production in the Zona Bragantina.  The elasticity of on-
farm fallow is positive across all models and significantly different from zero in three of 
the four models, varying from 0.10-0.17.  The IV estimates (Models (2) and (4)) are 
higher than those from the regular spatial errors models (Models (1) and (3)), supporting 
the intuition that unobservable land quality differences and measurement error may bias 
the estimates of fallow elasticity downward, though formal tests could not reject 
 
ln y = a0 + b1*ln x1 + u, for all farms with x2=0 
The two equations can be pooled to write 
ln y = b0 + (a0-b0)*D + b1*ln x1 + b2*ln z + u 
 where D is a dummy variable indicating non-use of x2 and z = max(D,x2).  This strategy assumes a 
constant parameter b1 and error u across both equations. 
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exogeneity of on-farm fallow.  These estimates suggest that own-fallow land makes a 
substantial contribution to crop output, close to that of hired labor or fertilizer.   










Log on-farm fallow area 0.098* 0.125 0.099* 0.174* 
[0.058] [0.078] [0.059] [0.091] 
0.366** 0.378**   Log off-farm fallow – upstream 
survey fallow area  [0.158] [0.184]   
 0.964** 0.458 Log off-farm fallow – 3 km 
upstream GIS canopy cover    [0.470] [0.755] 
Log cultivated area 0.414*** 0.405*** 0.442*** 0.434*** 
 [0.099] [0.101] [0.095] [0.096] 
Log family labor 0.128 0.126 0.068 0.075 
 [0.093] [0.094] [0.089] [0.089] 
Log hired labor 0.175*** 0.172*** 0.187*** 0.170*** 
 [0.065] [0.066] [0.061] [0.062] 
Log chemical fertilizer 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.169*** 0.160*** 
 [0.055] [0.056] [0.056] [0.058] 
0.911*** 0.914*** 0.835*** 0.833*** Perennial producer (binary) 
 [0.177] [0.178] [0.166] [0.167] 
Use extension services (binary) 0.262 0.27 0.21 0.212 
 [0.177] [0.178] [0.165] [0.167] 
Household head schooling years -0.018 -0.018 -0.022 -0.021 
 [0.025] [0.025] [0.024] [0.024] 
Farm owner (binary) 0.07 0.07 -0.027 -0.016 
 [0.157] [0.158] [0.149] [0.150] 
Black clay soil (binary) 0.221 0.227 0.204 0.186 
 [0.236] [0.238] [0.235] [0.237] 
Charcoal-enriched soil (binary) 0.373* 0.381* 0.378* 0.417* 
 [0.215] [0.216] [0.216] [0.220] 
Poor soil (binary) -0.122 -0.125 0.134 0.088 
 [0.309] [0.310] [0.282] [0.288] 
Slope -0.011 -0.013 -0.018 -0.012 
 [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.029] 
0.25 0.251 0.606** 0.476* Castanhal municipality (binary) 
 [0.228] [0.229] [0.246] [0.288] 
Igarapé Açu municipality (binary) 0.281 0.277 0.299 0.249 
 [0.229] [0.233] [0.216] [0.221] 
0.429 0.495 0.530** 0.683** No on-farm fallow (binary) 
 [0.285] [0.323] [0.264] [0.311] 
No upstream fallow area (binary) 1.102* 1.131*   
 
23 All regressions estimated in Stata 8 unless otherwise noted 
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[0.602] [0.657]   
No family labor (binary)  1.260* 1.243* 0.844 0.873 
 [0.651] [0.653] [0.647] [0.651] 
No hired labor (binary) 0.018 0.013 0.128 0.059 
 [0.284] [0.285] [0.270] [0.275] 
No fertilizer (binary) 0.174 0.157 0.302 0.273 
 [0.308] [0.312] [0.301] [0.304] 
Constant 3.343*** 3.202*** 1.323 2.905 
 [0.732] [0.758] [1.703] [2.597] 
-0.033      -0.055    -0.007    -0.020   Spatial error correlation coefficient 
(λ) [0.138] [0.142] [0.181] [0.147] 
Observations 228 228 251 251 
R-squared 0.60 0.60 0.57 0.56 
Log likelihood -313.83 -314.36 -349.64 -350.78 
Standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
The elasticity estimates are similar in magnitude to those from other econometric 
and agronomic studies.  For instance, López (1993, 1997, 1998) finds the village-level 
fallow biomass factor share to vary between 0.15 and 0.2 in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire.  
Mendoza (2004) uses the same data set as the present study to estimate the contribution 
of fallow length to plot-level cassava profits, finding an output elasticity of 0.22.  An 
Altamira, Pará, field study finds the elasticity of maize yields with respect to fallow age 
to be 0.33 (Silva-Forsberg et al. 1997).  An agronomic study from the Zona Bragantina 
showed rice yields to improve by 10-44% as fallow age increased from four to ten years, 
corresponding to a fallow elasticity of 0.07-0.29, with the lower elasticities found on 
fields to which fertilizer was applied (Kato et al. 1999).  The wide use of fertilizer by 
sampled farms may help explain why the elasticities estimated in this study fall in the 
lower range of previous studies.    
 The estimated elasticity of off-farm fallow in crop production is also positive 
across all four estimates, providing evidence that upstream forest fallow improves 
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productivity for downstream farms.  The actual elasticity estimate varies considerably 
based on the estimator used.  Models (1) and (2), which use survey-reported fallow area 
as the measure of upstream fallow, show a significant and positive elasticity of 0.37-0.38.  
In Model (3), which employs the GIS canopy cover variable to measure off-site fallow, 
the elasticity jumps to 0.96.  This high coefficient could result from off-farm canopy 
cover proxying for on-farm biomass density, which is not completely reflected by the on-
farm fallow area variable.  The IV estimate of upstream canopy cover in Model (4) drops 
to 0.46, much closer in magnitude to the elasticities from Models (1) and (2), though not 
significantly different from zero.  The magnitude of the externality effects estimated in 
Models (1) and (2) is similar to the results from the Ruteng National Park, Indonesia, 
study, where a 10% increase in soil moisture due to afforestation was associated with a 2-
3% boost in farm profits (Pattanayak and Butry 2005).   
Although the limitations of cross-sectional, non-experimental data make obtaining 
precise parameter estimates difficult, the findings indicate that farms with more fallow 
both on-farm and upstream generally reap higher output yields, providing support for the 
hypothesis that neighbors’ forest fallow provides positive externalities to crop 
production.  I return to the discussion of forest fallow externalities after estimating the 
forest product equation later in this chapter.  
4.3.6 Resampling and robustness analysis 
 I carry out a number of robustness checks to ensure that the estimated elasticities 
of on- and off-farm fallow are indeed positive across different sub-samples of farmers.  
Table B3 reports least squares estimates of the crop production function when farms in 
the lowest and highest tenth percentiles of on-farm fallow area are excluded from the 
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analysis (columns 2 and 3).  Columns 4 and 5 exclude farms with the highest and lowest 
tenth percentiles of off-farm fallow area.  Table B4 repeats the exercise, using GIS 
canopy cover as the measure of upstream fallow.  The results show that the coefficient of 
on-farm fallow is relatively stable when farms at the tails of the distributions of the 
fallow variables are excluded from the regression, varying between 0.08-0.11.  Upstream 
fallow area is less robust, though still high in magnitude, ranging from 0.20-0.51.  The 
higher and statistically significant elasticity is estimated when the top tenth percentile of 
the sample is dropped.  Thus, the results on fallow externalities are driven particularly by 
farms that lie downstream of relatively less forested areas.  The elasticity of GIS canopy 
cover varies from 0.92-1.14 and is significantly different from zero in both sub-groups, 
indicating that the estimates are robust.   
Figures B1 and B2 show on-farm and upstream fallow elasticities with 95% 
confidence intervals when each observation is dropped one-by-one in a leave-one-out 
cross-validation procedure (LOOCV; see, e.g., Stone 1974, Geiser 1975.  Figures B3 and 
B4 repeat the exercise for on-farm fallow and upstream canopy cover.  The elasticity 
estimates fall within a similar range as those estimated when dropping the top and bottom 
tenth percentiles: 0.07-0.12 for on-farm fallow, 0.30-0.43 for upstream survey-reported 
fallow area, and 0.82-1.07 for upstream GIS canopy cover.  Averaging the results of the 
LOOCV gives elasticities of 0.099 and 0.367 for on-farm and upstream fallow area 
(Model 1) and 0.099 and 0.966 for on-farm fallow and upstream canopy cover (Model 3), 
all very close to the SEM estimates reported in Table 4.5 
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Finally, the bootstrap bias estimates of on- and off-farm fallow elasiticities from 
the four models calculated using 500 replications indicate that the finite sample biases are 
small relative to the sizes of the parameter estimates (Table B5). 
As an additional verification that forest cover provides hydrological externalities, 
I also estimate all four specifications of the crop production function including 
downstream forest cover as an additional regressor.  If forest cover provides positive 
hydrological externalities, then upstream forest cover will affect crop production but 
downstream forest cover will not.  Table B6 presents the results of these regressions.  
Across all four models, downstream forest cover has no significant effect on crop value, 
in contrast to the elasticity of upstream forest cover.  In fact, the coefficient on 
downstream forest cover is negative in Models (1) and (2) and is very small in magnitude 
in Models (3) and (4).  These findings support the contention that forest cover improves 
crop output by regulating floods and soil moisture, and that other potential non-
hydrological services such as crop pollination do not drive the results. 
4.3.7 Other factors of production 
 Elasticity estimates for the remaining inputs are largely positive and significantly 
different from zero across all four specifications.  Cultivated area makes the most 
substantial contribution to crop output, with an elasticity of 0.41-0.44.  Hired labor and 
fertilizer are also important, supplying 16-18% and 11-14% of crop output, respectively.  
Production of perennial crops, which command higher market prices than annuals, raises 
output value considerably.  Agroecological variables are also important in determining 
output value—black clay and charcoal-enriched soils boost output, while poor soils and 
steeper slopes dampen it, though only the effect of charcoal-enriched soil is statistically 
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significant.  The household head’s years of schooling, use of extension services, and 
ownership of the farm have no effect on output value, which may indicate that 
differences in management ability are reflected in input quantities used rather than farmer 
characteristics.  Models (3) and (4) indicate that farms in Castanhal municipality garner 
higher crop revenues than those from Igarapé Açu or Bragança.   
 Dummy variables representing non-use of inputs indicate whether non-users have 
a different intercept than farmers who use all inputs in positive quantities.  Models (1) 
and (2) indicate that farms using no family labor and farms with no upstream fallow area 
produce higher crop values, while Models (3) and (4) suggest that farms allocating no 
land to fallow earn higher revenues. 
4.4 Forest product harvesting function 
I now turn to forest product harvesting, an important use of fallow land beyond 
the ecosystem services it provides in crop production.  Sixty-nine percent of farmers in 
the sample collect products from their fallow land.  The most common products are wood 
and charcoal, used primarily for cooking fuel, though farmers also gather honey and 
forest fruits.  Most of the produce is reserved for home consumption, with only one 
farmer selling the entire harvest.  Twenty-six percent of forest product harvesters both 
consume and sell some of their yields.  Forest products tends to be overshadowed by 
cropping, comprising just 14% of the income from farm activities on average, but they do 
make up the main source of farm income for 13% of farmers in sample.  In addition, 
some studies argue that forest product harvesting represents an important risk mitigation 
or “natural insurance” strategy for small-scale farmers (Pattanayak and Sills 2001, 
Hedden-Dunkhorst et al. 2003).  Other studies from the Amazon indicate that forest 
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product harvesting can contribute substantially to shifting cultivators’ incomes, though 
virgin forest may yield more lucrative products than secondary forest (Smith et al. 1999). 
I estimate an equation to measure the value of fallow in harvested forest products. 
The dependent variable is the log of forest product value.  Although most products are 
reserved for home consumption, I aggregate over different commodities using farmer-
reported market prices in the absence of alternative weights.   
The logs of on-farm and upstream fallow land are the primary regressors of 
interest.  On-farm fallow land proxies for fallow biomass, which is the source of the 
harvested commodities.  Upstream forest fallow may facilitate easier harvesting and more 
abundant products by moderating floods and soil moisture, as well as harboring insects 
for fruit and nut tree pollination.  I again use the two alternative measures of off-farm 











Here, qi represents the value of forest product harvests.  On- and off-farm fallow 
are again given by fi and F, respectively, while W1 represents the same row-normalized 
spatial weighting matrix as that used in the crop production function, which gives all 
upstream neighbors equal importance.  Use of the same weighting matrix is appropriate if 
the externalities provided to forest products are similar to those relevant in crop 
production.  Household characteristics expected to affect output value are included in the 
vector Hi. The disturbance, εi, is again comprised of a component that varies 
systematically over space with inverse distance, λW2ε, and white noise, ui. I also use 
Battese’s (1997) approach, discussed in the crop production section, adding dummy 
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variables to indicate observations with no fallow on their own farms and no fallow 
upstream.   
I cannot estimate a structural production function due to missing input data, 
namely harvesting labor.  To proxy for the labor available for collecting, I include the log 
of household size and the agricultural wage rate in Hi. I also include the black clay, 
charcoal-enriched, and poor soil type indicators and slope to control for land quality.  I 
add variables indicating ownership of firewood and gas stoves, as cooking fuel is an 
important commodity for home consumption.  I also include three indicators of 
household wealth—car ownership, television ownership, and electricity use—to examine 
whether low-income households are more likely to collect forest products.  Other control 
variables include forest product prices,24 the household head’s education level and 
ownership of the farm, and municipality dummies.   
4.4.1 Treatment of censoring in forest product harvests 
 Because only 69% of farms harvest forest products, the econometric model must 
account for censoring to consistently estimate the parameters of interest.  The widely-
used Tobit model incorporates features of probit and continuous regressions to account 
for the binary choice of whether to engage in the activity and the level of output 
conditional on choosing to participate.  However, the Tobit restricts the effects of the 
explanatory variables to be equal across the binary decision and the conditional outcome.  
Two-part hurdle models relax this assumption, allowing for different effects across the 
 
24 In the absence of data on market prices for the harvested commodities, I use village medians of farmer-
reported forest product prices as regressors to avoid bias due to common measurement error and quality 
effects by including farmer-reported prices directly on both sides of the equation.  Use of unit value cluster 
means outperforms other proxies for market prices in estimating price elasticities in a study using 
Vietnamese data (Niimi 2005).  I use village medians to minimize the influence of outliers.   
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two equations.  A hurdle model of forest product harvesting with spatially correlated 





























where D denotes a dummy variable indicating participation in harvesting forest products.  
The selection equation is estimated using a probit model, while the conditional outcome 
equation can be estimated by ordinary least squares regression on the non-limit 
observations (discussed in Wooldridge 2001, p. 536) or truncated regression (Cragg 
1971).   
The Heckman selection model (1979) further generalizes the problem by allowing 
for correlation among the error terms of the two processes.  The Heckman model is 
superior in theory because it corrects for selection bias, which, if present and not 
controlled for, can lead to inconsistent estimates of the parameters of the outcome 
equation.  However, a drawback of the Heckman procedure is the need for an exclusion 
restriction—an exogenous variable that explains the binary choice but not the level of the 
conditional outcome.  In practice, it is rare to find valid exclusion restrictions that affect 
one equation of the model but not the other, and economic theory often provides little 
guidance in this respect. 
 Hurdle and selection models have proven particularly useful in applications such 
as tobacco and alcohol consumption, where the decision to abstain may be determined by 
factors very different from those governing the level of consumption for those who 
choose to indulge.  Another illustration relates to the value of fire damages: fires are less 
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likely to occur in newer buildings, but they cause higher value damages than those in 
older structures when they do (Fin and Schmidt 1984).   
These examples represent corner solutions or “real zeros,” rather than data 
censoring, similar to the case of forest product harvesting.  However, factors affecting 
demand for forest products, such as market prices, opportunity costs of labor, and land 
quality, may have similar effects on both the decision to harvest and the amount 
produced, making a Tobit model appealing.  Conversely, if the magnitudes of the effects 
differ across the two processes, a hurdle model is more appropriate.  Because the same 
set of variables affects both the binary choice and conditional outcome, the lack of valid 
exclusion restrictions makes the Heckman selection model infeasible to implement, even 
though it would be ideal if reasonable exclusion restrictions were available.   
I test the Tobit restriction against the two-part Cragg hurdle model, which nests 
the Tobit, to determine whether the coefficients vary across the two processes, again 
using both survey-reported fallow area and GIS canopy cover as alternative upstream 
fallow variables.  The results of these regressions are reported in Table B7.  The 
explanatory variables do differ in magnitude, and in some cases even sign, across the 
probit and non-limit regression models.  Indeed, a likelihood ratio test rejects equality of 
the coefficients across the two equations for all four model specifications (p = 0.00).  
Therefore, I use the hurdle model estimates in the remainder of my analysis.  I employ 
the two-part probit-least squares model rather than the Cragg approach to facilitate 
estimation using spatially-correlated errors and instrumental variables. 
65
4.4.2 Identification and instrumental variables                 
In addition to the issues raised by censoring, potential measurement error, 
simultaneity, and omitted variables are again concerns in obtaining consistent parameter 
estimates.  Similar to the omitted variable problem raised in the crop production function, 
poor land quality may lead farmers to allocate more land to fallow but reap lower yields 
of forest products, biasing the on-farm fallow coefficient downward.  Measurement error 
may also lead to attenuation bias on the coefficients of both on- and off-farm fallow since 
fallow biomass is proxied by either fallow area or canopy cover.  The elasticity of GIS 
off-farm canopy cover may also be overestimated and the elasticity of on-farm fallow 
area underestimated if GIS canopy cover is correlated with on-farm fallow biomass 
density.  Simultaneity between fallow area and forest product output may bias the 
coefficient of on-farm fallow upwards as well, though it is less likely to affect the 
coefficient of off-farm fallow. 
I employ similar approaches as those used in the crop production estimation to 
address concerns about endogeneity in the absence of panel or experimental data that 
would allow for cleaner identification.  Control variables on land quality and farmer 
wealth and education are included directly in both the probit and non-limit regressions 
models.  Spatially correlated errors are also included in both to reflect unobserved factors 
that vary between farms with distance.   
I use instrumental variables as a final strategy to confront endogeneity issues.  I 
employ the log of farm size as an instrument for on-farm fallow.  Total farm size 
determines the land available for allocation to fallow.  However, beyond its affect on the 
size of fallow land, farm area should have no direct effect on forest product harvests.  
Forest product prices and firewood and gas stove ownership, used as instruments for 
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fallow in the crop production function, are not valid exclusion restrictions and are 
included in the forest products equation.  I employ spatially-lagged values of farm size 
and several other household-level exogenous variables from the forest products equation 
as instruments for off-farm fallow. 
The instruments explain much of the variation in on-farm fallow area, upstream 
fallow area, and canopy cover, as seen in first-stage equations with R-squared statistics of 
0.74, 0.90, and 0.72, respectively (Table B8).  The log of farm size is highly significant in 
predicting the log of fallow area (p = 0.00) across both specifications (columns 1 and 3).  
The spatially-lagged values of farms size and car ownership significantly predict both 
upstream fallow area and canopy cover, as does location in Castanhal or Igarapé Açu.  
Television ownership, gas stove ownership, and black clay soil on upstream farms also 
negatively affect upstream fallow area (column 2), while lagged firewood stove 
ownership and poor soil upstream help explain canopy cover (column 4).   
Overidentification tests confirm that the instruments are uncorrelated with forest 
product harvesting decisions and output value (p = 0.40-0.89 and 0.77-0.95).  They area 
also uncorrelated with the outcome variables individually, as shown by including each in 
the outcome equations (p = 0.14-0.88).  Table B9 reports the results of these tests.  
Certain lagged household characteristics, including education, farm ownership, electricity 
use, and slope were not used as instruments because they were found to be correlated 
with the forest product harvesting decision or conditional value. 
Hausman test results indicate that on- and off-farm fallow can be considered 
exogenous to the forest product harvesting decision in Model (1) but not in Model (3), 
nor are they exogenous to the value of forest products conditional on harvesting.  
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Therefore, the IV estimates of the probit and non-limit regressions are consistent, while 
the regular SEM-probit and non-limit regression estimates are not. 
4.4.3 Results 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show the results of the forest product harvesting participation 
and outcome equations, respectively.  Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4.6 report probit and 
IV probit coefficient estimates using survey-derived off-farm fallow area as the off-farm 
fallow variable.  Columns (3) and (4) instead use GIS canopy cover.  Table 4.7 follows 
the same pattern, with columns (1) and (2) giving non-limit regression and IV estimates 
using survey-reported off-farm fallow area, and columns (3) and (4) using GIS canopy 
cover.  The spatial correlation coefficient of the probit equation error term is positive and 
significant across all four models, indicating that unobservable factors do have similar 
effects on neighbors’ harvesting decisions.  The error terms are not significantly spatially 
correlated in the non-limit regressions, however.   
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Log on-farm fallow area 0.281*** 0.370*** 0.300***         0.362*** 
[0.110] [0.146] [0.094]                     [0.159] 
0.430 0.425   Log off-farm fallow – upstream 
survey fallow area  [0.278] [0.302]   
 1.268         3.390** Log off-farm fallow – 3 km 
upstream GIS canopy cover   [0.809]         [1.581] 
-0.224790         -0.181 0.099         0.069 Forest product price (village 
median) 0.182062 [0.168] [0.108]                          [0.119]
Log household size  0.965***         0.962*** 0.854***         0.890*** 
 [0.300] [0.260] [0.234]                [0.246] 
Agricultural wage rate -0.245***         -0.234*** -0.201**         -0.219*** 
 [0.010] [0.095] [0.081]                        [0.086]
Household head schooling years  0.051         0.061* 0.042         -0.043 
 [0.047] [0.043] [0.038]                         [0.260]
Farm owner (binary) 0.303         0.274 0.003         0.046 
 [0.294] [0.275] [0.249]                            [0.045]
Own car (binary) -0.975***         -0.936*** -0.849**        -0.847** 
 [0.403] [0.397] [0.388]                              [0.390]
Own television (binary) 0.047         -0.015 0.034         0.168 
 [0.314] [0.320] [0.292]                 [0.302] 
Use electricity (binary) -0.841***         -0.744*** -0.773***         -0.753*** 
 [0.335] [0.316] [0.289]             [0.296] 
Own firewood stove (binary) 0.293         0.326 0.358         0.309 
 [0.329] [0.319] [0.290]                      [0.311]
Own gas stove (binary) -1.498***         -1.478*** -1.089***         -1.215*** 
 [0.552] [0.553] [0.404]                 [0.476] 
Black clay soil (binary) 0.851*        0.858* 0.595*         0.591* 
 [0.534] [0.550] [0.470]                  [0.430] 
Charcoal-enriched soil (binary) 0.197         0.185 0.052         0.0422 
 [0.396] [0.394] [0.365]                 [0.386] 
Poor soil (binary) -0.381         -0.311 -0.279         -0.170 
 [0.602] [0.609] [0.525]                         [0.504]
Slope -0.008         -0.020 -0.024         -0.065* 
 [0.054] [0.053] [0.045]                       [0.051]
Castanhal municipality (binary) 0.742**         0.685** 0.813**         1.435*** 
 [0.404] [0.423] [0.431]                     [0.632] 
1.497***         1.401*** 0.887*** 1.092*** Igarapé Açu municipality 
(binary) [0.479] [0.509] [0.414]                        [0.456]
No on-farm fallow area (binary) 0.248 0.581 0.047         0.428 
 [0.483] [0.592] [0.425]                   [0.577] 
No upstream fallow area (binary) -2.858**         -3.018**   
 
25 Spatial errors probit model estimated using Gibbs sampler algorithm in Matlab (LeSage 1998). 
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[1.441] [1.384]   
Constant 0.936         0.364 -3.971*         -11.186*** 
 [1.568] [1.667] [2.783]   [5.007] 
0.535***        0.545*** 0.490***     0.506*** Spatial error correlation 
coefficient (λ) [0.245] [0.234] [0.252] [0.237] 
Observations 236 236 261 261 
McFadden R-squared 0.30 0.29 0.25 0.26 
Standard errors in brackets    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 










Log on-farm fallow area 0.065 0.283** 0.021 0.264 
[0.107] [0.139] [0.113] [0.166] 
0.549** 0.548*   Log off-farm fallow – upstream 
survey fallow area  [0.278] [0.322]   
 0.913 0.093 Log off-farm fallow – 3 km 
upstream GIS canopy cover   [0.811] [1.418] 
0.037 0.116 0.150 0.202 Forest product price (village 
median) [0.187] [0.191] [0.176] [0.179] 
Log household size  0.087 0.113 0.225 0.234 
 [0.265] [0.264] [0.261] [0.259] 
Agricultural wage rate 0.027 0.01 -0.028 -0.032 
 [0.100] [0.098] [0.088] [0.089] 
Household head schooling years  0.03 0.041 0.071 0.082* 
 [0.047] [0.047] [0.046] [0.046] 
Farm owner (binary) -0.191 -0.201 -0.325 -0.267 
 [0.267] [0.264] [0.271] [0.270] 
Own car (binary) 1.215** 1.217** 1.102** 1.110** 
 [0.525] [0.517] [0.512] [0.509] 
Own television (binary) 0.631** 0.652** 0.691** 0.668** 
 [0.274] [0.271] [0.273] [0.278] 
Use electricity (binary) -1.078*** -1.102*** -1.031*** -1.087*** 
 [0.270] [0.268] [0.269] [0.273] 
Own firewood stove (binary) 0.406 0.386 0.311 0.406 
 [0.378] [0.373] [0.392] [0.391] 
Own gas stove (binary) -0.017 -0.088 0.104 0.027 
 [0.308] [0.305] [0.305] [0.308] 
Black clay soil (binary) 0.963** 0.968** 0.758* 0.786* 
 [0.413] [0.408] [0.403] [0.402] 
Charcoal-enriched soil (binary) -0.124 -0.079 -0.439 -0.359 
 [0.386] [0.382] [0.394] [0.397] 
Poor soil (binary) 0.44 0.522 0.612 0.59 
 [0.537] [0.534] [0.522] [0.530] 
Slope -0.064 -0.084* -0.073 -0.076 
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[0.048] [0.049] [0.047] [0.052] 
Castanhal municipality (binary) 0.647 0.625 0.656 0.434 
 [0.442] [0.446] [0.484] [0.578] 
0.235 0.136 -0.068 -0.221 Igarapé Açu municipality 
(binary) [0.462] [0.481] [0.409] [0.427] 
No on-farm fallow area (binary) -0.178 0.352 -0.113 0.562 
 [0.563] [0.604] [0.560] [0.616] 
No upstream fallow area (binary) 0.401 0.007   
 [1.633] [1.655]   
Constant 2.942 2.116 0.953 3.062 
 [1.908] [2.003] [3.276] [5.100] 
0.153 0.176    0.084    0.090    Spatial error correlation 
coefficient (λ) [0.186] [0.197] [.214] [0.182] 
Observations 167 167 184 184 
R-squared 0.19 0.20 0.17 0.18 
Log likelihood -293.23 -291.62 -331.08 -330.16 
Standard errors in brackets     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
 
While I use separate probit and non-limit regression models to estimate the 
parameters of the hurdle model, the combined effect or unconditional elasticity of the 
fallow variables are the main parameters of interest from the model of forest product 
harvesting.  The unconditional elasticity is the percent change in the value of forest 
products stemming from a 1% change in fallow, accounting for the effects on the 
probability of harvesting and on the value of the harvest conditional on participating.  
McDonald and Moffit (1980) derive the decomposition of these two effects in the Tobit 
context, showing that 
),0|()|0Pr()|( xyyExyxyE >⋅>=
Log differentiating this expression reveals that the unconditional elasticity is simply the 
sum of the probability elasticity and the conditional elasticity.  The non-limit regression 
equations estimate the conditional elasticity directly, since product value and fallow are 
expressed in log form.  I calculate the probability elasticities using the coefficients from 















where γ1 is the coefficient of the log of on-farm fallow from the probit equation, and γz is 
the linear prediction. 
Table 4.8 reports the probability, conditional, and unconditional elasticities of on- 
and off-farm fallow in forest product harvesting.  The unconditional output elasticity of 
on-farm fallow is positive across all four models, varying from 0.17 to 0.49.  However, it 
is higher in magnitude and significantly different from zero only in Models (2) and (4), 
when the IV approach addresses the endogeneity of on- and off-farm fallow.  This 
finding suggests that omitted variables and measurement error may indeed bias the 
estimates of the probability and conditional elasticities downward.  These results confirm 
that on-farm fallow makes an important contribution to the value of forest products, as 
expected.  In fact, the elasticities derived from the IV estimates suggest that on-farm 
fallow contributes close to 50% of the value of forest products.   
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Table 4.8 Forest product harvesting elasticities  
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Standard errors of the probability elasticities were calculated using the delta method.   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
 
The estimates of the unconditional elasticity of off-farm fallow are also all 
positive, spanning 0.62-2.19.  Similar to the results from the crop production function, the 
elasticity of upstream fallow area is significantly greater than zero (Models 1 and 2).  The 
elasticity of upstream canopy cover is extremely high in Model 3, though not 
significantly different from zero, which may result from the bias caused by collinearity 
with on-farm biomass density.  The IV estimate (Model 4) is again not significantly 
different from zero, but the magnitude of the elasticity is closer to that of the upstream 
fallow area variable.  These results suggest that farms located downstream of neighbors 
with higher levels of forest fallow garner higher incomes from forest products, even 
accounting for positive spatial correlation in omitted variables affecting neighbors’ 
harvesting decisions.  The net effect is positive and statistically significant for two out of 
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four estimates.  Thus, these findings provide some support the hypothesis that upstream 
forest fallow provides positive externalities not only in crop production but also in forest 
product harvests, thought the results are less conclusive than those from the crop 
production function. 
4.4.4 Resampling and robustness analysis 
 I carry out similar tests of robustness to those used in the crop production section 
to investigate whether the results hold across different sub-groups of farmers.  Excluding 
farms from the top and bottom tenth percentiles of on-farm fallow from the probit and 
non-limit regressions, I find that the results are largely stable.  On-farm fallow has a 
positive and significant effect on the probability of harvesting across the different sub-
samples, though it has no significant effect on the conditional value of the harvest (Tables 
B10-B13).  The effect of upstream fallow area is somewhat less robust across different 
groups—farms with more fallow upstream experience a much larger impact on the 
probability of harvesting, but find less of an effect on the conditional harvest value.  
Upstream canopy cover has a consistent effect on the probability of harvesting across 
different sub-samples, but farms with less upstream canopy cover reap greater benefits in 
terms of harvest value. 
 Figures B5-B8 plot estimates of the total elasticities of on-farm and upstream 
fallow with 95% confidence intervals from probit and non-limit regressions using the 
leave-one-out cross-validation procedure.  The total elasticity estimates do vary quite a 
bit, ranging from 0.09-0.20 for on-farm fallow, 0.52-0.78 for upstream fallow area, and 
1.05-1.52 for upstream canopy cover, with means of 0.130-0.155, 0.701, and 1.369, 
respectively.  Thus, while total elasticity estimates for forest product harvests with 
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respect to on-farm and upstream fallow are positive across different sub-samples of 
farmers, they are more variable than those from the crop production function.  
 I also investigate whether fallow externalities only arise from upstream forest 
cover by estimating the probit and non-limit regressions including downstream fallow.  I 
find that downstream fallow has no significant effect on the probability of harvesting 
forest products, and the coefficient is actually negative across all four models (Table 
B14).  The results from the conditional outcome equation are less conclusive—Models 
(2)-(4) show downstream fallow to have a positive effect on harvest value, though it is 
only significant in Model (4).  Thus, I cannot confirm whether the positive effects of off-
farm fallow on forest product harvests are strictly hydrological, flowing from upstream to 
downstream, or whether pollination, tree seed availability, or other potential forest 
ecosystem services may play a role.     
4.4.5 Other factors affecting forest product harvests 
Turning to the other explanatory variables in the hurdle model of forest product 
harvesting, labor availability is important in the decision to collect forest products, as 
indicated by the positive and significant coefficient of the log of household size and the 
negative and significant coefficient of the wage rate in the probit equation.  Ownership of 
a gas stove is negatively associated with harvesting forest products, as expected given 
these farms’ decreased reliance on firewood as a cooking fuel.  Farms that do not own a 
car or use electricity are more likely to collect forest products, implying that low-income 
farmers rely more heavily on forest products than do better-off households.  However, car 
and television ownership have the opposite effect on the conditional value of forest 
products, suggesting that wealthier households reap greater value from this activity when 
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they choose to participate.  The effect of electricity use is again negative, though.  
Families with a more educated household head also earn higher revenues from 
harvesting.  Land quality affects harvests as well: favorable black clay soils and less 
steeply-sloped land increase the conditional value of harvested products.  Farmers located 
in Castanhal and Igarapé Açu are more likely to collect forest products than those in 
Bragança.  In addition, households’ whose upstream neighbors maintain no fallow area 
are significantly less likely to harvest any forest products  Village median forest product 
prices, firewood stove ownership, and farm ownership do not have significant effects on 
the probability of harvesting or on conditional harvest value.   
4.5 Total on- and off-farm fallow elasticities 
To better understand the economic significance of forest fallow services in farm 
activities, I calculate the total farm output elasticity of on- and off-farm fallow using the 
results from all four models of the crop and forest product equations.  The total output 
elasticities of on- and off-farm fallow account for their contribution to both crop and 
forest product income and vary by farm with the share of income from each activity.  
Each column corresponds to the set of elasticity estimates used from the crop output and 
forest product value equations to calculate the total output elasticities (Table 4.9).  For 
example, column (1) reports the results using the SEM estimates of the crop output 
elasticities (Table 4.5, column 1) and the SEM-probit and non-limit regression estimates 
of the forest product elasticities (Tables 4.6-4.7, column 1) of on-farm fallow and 
upstream fallow area.   
The mean elasticity of on-farm fallow ranges from 0.10-0.22 depending on the 
estimates used, but is significantly different from zero in all four specifications.  This 
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consistently positive mean elasticity underscores the importance of forest fallow to farms 
in the Zona Bragantina in providing both consumable products and ecological support 
services.   
Table 4.9 Total output elasticities of on- and off-farm fallow 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total output elasticity of on-farm 









Total output elasticity of upstream 









Note: sample means of standard errors given in parentheses were calculated using the 
estimated standard errors from the previous analyses. 
 
In addition, the mean output elasticity of upstream fallow is significantly different 
from zero in three of the four sets of estimates, spanning 0.42-1.03.  The effect of off-
farm fallow on farm revenue appears to be important both statistically and in magnitude.  
Moreover, at least for crop production, the externalities appear to be hydrologically-
based, as indicated by the positive and significant effect of upstream but not downstream 
forest cover on crop value.   
These findings support the hypothesis that upstream forest fallow provides flows 
of economically significant ecological services to farms in the Zona Bragantina.  This 
evidence suggests that off-site hydrological regulation may be important even in low and 
moderately sloped regions with porous soils, not only in steeply-sloped, clayey areas like 
Ruteng National Park, Indonesia, where forest hydrological externalities also 
significantly contribute to farm productivity (Pattanayak and Kramer 2001, Pattanayak 
and Butry 2005).  These hydrological support services may justify continued allocation of 
significant amounts of land to forest fallow in the future, even if farms increasingly 
substitute chemical fertilizer for fallow-based soil nutrients. 
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It is unclear from this analysis whether farms recognize these off-site ecological 
services and respond to them in their own land allocation decisions.  I also cannot infer from 
these results whether farmers allocate land between cultivation and fallow efficiently, either 
from a private or social perspective.  I turn to these two questions in the chapters that follow. 
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5 Strategic fallow management: a spatial analysis 
Results from the crop and forest product equations imply that off-farm fallow may 
provide significant ecological services to farms in the Eastern Amazon.  If off-farm fallow 
does provides ecological services that fulfill some of the same functions as on-farm fallow, it 
is unclear whether farmers recognize these benefits or take advantage of them through their 
own allocation of land.  In this section, I estimate an equation to determine the impact of 
upstream forest fallow on downstream farms’ land allocation.   
The theoretical model of shifting cultivation discussed in Chapter 3 predicts that 
neighboring forest fallow has an ambiguous effect on own-farm land allocation, 
depending on the relative strengths of the externalities provided to crops and forest 
products.  If the externality is more important in cropping than forest products, then farms 
will tend to expand cultivation and contract the area under fallow in response to an 
increase in upstream forest cover; if the forest product externality dominates, the reverse 
is true.  Since cropping is the dominant activity in the Zona Bragantina, I might expect 
farmers to reduce their own fallow land and expand cultivated area to take advantage of 
their neighbors’ fallow biomass.  Such strategic behavior would lead to negative spatial 
correlation in fallow.  Nelson and Hellerstein (1997) find a negative spatial lag in forest 
cover in central Mexico, though the authors posit no explanation for this relationship.   
5.1 Econometric model 
Identifying spatial correlation in an observed dependent variable is complicated 
by the potential for underlying spatial correlation in unobserved factors affecting land 
use, so I allow for spatial correlation in both processes.  I use a general spatial model that 
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incorporates both a spatial lag in the dependent variable and spatial autocorrelation in the 















The dependent variable is the percent area under fallow.  As in the previously 
estimated equations, fi represents on-farm fallow area, while F is a vector of all other 
farms’ fallow area, and Li is total available land.  I do not take logarithms of the fallow 
variables in this analysis to avoid problems raised by the 14% of observations that 
allocate no land to fallow.  The row-normalized spatial weighting matrix W1 serves to 
indicate which farms are upstream neighbors of farm i and gives each upstream neighbor 
equal weight.  Thus, I estimate the percent of on-farm fallow area as a function of the 
weighted average of upstream fallow area, W1lnF.   
Zi is a vector of household attributes expected to affect land allocation, while εi is 
a disturbance term that may itself be spatially correlated.  W2 is spatial weighting matrix 
of inverse distances applied to the disturbance, while ui is a white noise error term.  As in 
the crop and forest product equations, the different structures for the two spatial 
weighting matrices both ensures identification of the spatial autoregressive parameters 
and reflects the different likely patterns of spatial variation in the forest externality and 
the unobserved variables affecting land use.  I interpret a test of the significance of ρ, the 
spatial lag coefficient, as a test for strategic behavior in land use.   
Estimation of the spatial lag model must address the endogeneity caused by 
dependence among observations of the fallow variable to ensure consistent parameter 
estimates.  The asymmetric direction of the externality (upstream to downstream) 
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decreases the likelihood that the spatial lag of fallow will be correlated with the residual 
of the percent fallow equation.  However, I employ an IV approach to control for 
potential simultaneity between on- and off-farm fallow.   
The instrumental variables estimator provides asymptotically consistent parameter 
estimates of the spatial lag model, though it is less widely used than maximum likelihood 
(Anselin 1988).  Anselin suggests using spatial lags of the exogenous regressors in the 
model as a possible set of instruments for the lagged dependent variable.  I follow this 
approach.  Thus, the weighted average of prices, household attributes, and agroecological 
characteristics faced by each farm’s upstream neighbors are used to predict off-farm 
fallow to address simultaneity issues.  Table C1 reports the first stage equations for off-
farm forest fallow.   
I include several household characteristics in the fallow equation expected to 
affect land allocation decisions.  Forest product prices and firewood- and gas-stove 
ownership affect returns to fallowing from forest product harvesting.  Likewise, output 
prices of annual and perennial crops and fertilizer prices affect the opportunity cost of 
land allocated between fallow and cultivation.  The theoretical model in Chapter 3 
predicts that higher forest product and fertilizer prices increase land allocated to fallow, 
while higher crop output prices favor moving land into cultivation.  I include 
transportation costs and frequency in case market access affects land allocation decisions.    
The log of household size and the wage rate affect labor availability for land clearing and 
cultivation, though the theoretical model does not unambiguously predict the direction of 
the effect.  Total farm size determines land availability for allocation to fallow, and other 
studies of shifting cultivation find smaller farms to cultivate land more intensively (Smith 
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et al. 1999, Coomes et al. 2000).  I include several proxies for household wealth, 
including farm ownership, car and television ownership, and electricity use.  
Agroecological characteristics may also be important if farms with more steeply sloped 
land or poorer quality soils allocate more land to fallow to prevent erosion or nutrient 
loss.  I include the household head’s schooling years and municipality dummies as 
additional controls.   
5.2 Results  
Table 5.1 presents the results from the spatial lag model of fallow area.  I report 
estimates using the survey-reported upstream fallow and GIS upstream canopy cover 
variables in columns 1 and 2, respectively.  Rho represents the coefficient on the 
weighted average of neighbors’ fallow land.  Results from both models indicate that 
neighbors’ fallow area is not a significant determinant of percent area under fallow26. In 
fact, the coefficient is actually positive across both specifications, rather than negative, as 
would be expected if farms substitute neighbors’ forest fallow services for their own in 
crop production.  In addition, λ is not significantly different from zero and is negative in 
both models, suggesting that unobserved factors varying with distance between farms do 
not explain a substantial portion of the variation in the percent of farmland allocated to 
fallow.   
 
26 Results are not qualitatively different if total area or percent area under fallow are used as either the 
dependent variable or the spatially-lagged variable. 
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Table 5.1 Spatial lag model of percent on-farm fallow area (2SLS estimates) 
 (1) (2) 
0.001  Spatial lag coefficient) – upstream 
survey fallow area (ρ) [0.002]  
 0.009 Spatial lag coefficient – 3 km upstream 
GIS canopy cover (ρ) [0.007] 
Forest product price (farmer-reported) 0.003** 0.002* 
 [0.001] [0.001] 
Annual crop price index -0.106 -0.092 
 [0.121] [0.102] 
Perennial crop price index -0.023 -0.007 
 [0.016] [0.016] 
Fertilizer price index 0.211 0.221 
 [0.314] [0.299] 
Transportation cost -0.542 -3.711 
 [5.062] [5.293] 
Transportation frequency -0.02 -0.027 
 [0.018] [0.017] 
Wage rate -0.009 -0.001 
 [0.015] [0.013] 
Log household size  -0.004 0.013 
 [0.040] [0.038] 
Log farm size  0.077*** 0.074*** 
 [0.017]  [0.018] 
Farm owner (binary) 0.132*** 0.131*** 
 [0.042] [0.040] 
Log household head years of schooling 0.008 0.007 
 [0.007] [0.007] 
Own firewood stove (binary) 0.06 0.041 
 [0.054] [0.054] 
Own gas stove (binary) -0.074 -0.066 
 [0.056] [0.054] 
Own car (binary) -0.05 -0.054 
 [0.072] [0.069] 
Own television (binary) 0.051 0.033 
 [0.048] [0.046] 
Use electricity (binary) -0.110** -0.073 
 [0.049] [0.048] 
Black clay soil (binary) -0.025 -0.052 
 [0.070] [0.068] 
Charcoal-enriched soil (binary) 0.04 0.057 
 [0.063] [0.064] 
Poor soil (binary) 0.06 0.12 
 [0.090] [0.081] 
Slope 0.004 0.005 
 [0.009] [0.008] 
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Castanhal municipality (binary) 0.155* 0.152* 
 [0.090] [0.087] 
Igarapé Açu municipality (binary) 0.028 0.024 
 [0.096] [0.091] 
Constant 0.219 -0.103 
 [0.396] [0.406] 
Spatial error correlation coefficient (λ) -0.067 -0.058 
 [0.191] [0.197] 
Observations 236 261 
R-squared 0.23 0.26 
Log likelihood -29.56 -31.98 
Standard errors in brackets   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Factors that do affect farms’ distribution of land between fallow and cultivation 
include prices, farm size, and farm ownership.  Crop prices, both annual and perennial, 
have a negative effect on fallow, while fertilizer and forest product prices has a positive 
effect, though only the latter coefficient is significantly different from zero.  These results 
confirm the predictions of the theoretical model in Chapter 3 that crop prices raise the 
opportunity cost of fallowing, while fertilizer and forest product prices increase the 
opportunity cost of cultivation.  Electricity use is negatively associated with more on-
farm fallow in Model 1, indicating that poorer households or those with less access to 
infrastructure cultivate land less intensively.  Fallowing increases with steeper slopes and 
poor soils and decreases with black clay soils, though these effects are not statistically 
significant.  As anticipated, ownership of a firewood stove has a positive effect on fallow 
area, and ownership of a gas stove has a negative effect, though again not at statistically 
significant levels.  Household size, wage rate, transportation cost and frequency, car and 
television ownership, and education of the household head also have no effect on fallow 
allocation.  These factors aside, farms in Castanhal allocate more land to fallow 
compared to those in Igarapé Açu or Bragança.   
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The outcome of the spatial model of fallowing suggests that farms do not respond 
strategically to their neighbors’ fallow land when determining their own land allocation.  
However, the strength of this conclusion is tempered by the ambiguous prediction from 
the theoretical model, which suggests that a farm’s response to upstream fallow depends 
on whether it garners more important externalities in crop production or forest product 
harvesting.  Since the econometric results from Chapter 4 indicate that off-farm fallow 
provides ecological services to both activities, the two effects may cancel each other out 
in aggregate, leading upstream fallow to have little impact on farmers’ land use decisions 
even if they recognize the ecological services and wish to take advantage of them. 
85
6 Are farmers allocating land between cultivation and 
fallow optimally?  
 As seen in the crop, forest product, and total output elasticity results discussed in 
Chapter 4, on-farm fallow is positively associated with farm output and it may also 
provide positive externalities to downstream neighbors.  However, the total output 
elasticity does not capture the net benefits of on-farm fallow land, which must take into 
account the opportunity cost of land left out of cultivation.  Indeed, another study from 
Pará calculates that converting fallow to cultivated land and replacing the lost biomass 
nutrients entirely with purchased chemical fertilizer would lead to higher farm profits 
(Toniolo and Uhl 1995).  Likewise, a study from the Philippines finds that use of 
hedgerows improves soil quality, but the net improvement in farm profits is minor due to 
the loss of labor and land used directly in cultivation (Pattanayak and Mercer 1998).   
I estimate the crop output elasticity of cultivated land to be considerably higher 
than the total output elasticity of on-farm fallow (0.41-0.44 compared to 0.10-0.17, 
respectively).  Given the direct tradeoff between land used for cultivation and fallow, 
there may be gains to farmers from reallocating land between fallow and cropping, 
particularly since over 50% of land area is left out of cultivation at any one time among 
surveyed farms.   
Any such gains would be individual to the farm and may come at a cost to 
downstream farmers who benefit from forest hydrological services upstream.  However, 
it may be of interest to identify whether a private land tenure system such as prevails in 
the Zona Bragantina at least fosters efficient land allocation from an individual 
perspective.  
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Similar to López (1997), I construct a measure of the optimality of land allocation 
between cultivation and fallow, which I term the net elasticity of cultivated land.  The net 
elasticity of cultivated land represents the percent change in farm income from a 1% 
expansion of cultivated area into fallow area.  It also accounts for the cost of labor used 
for clearing land, which increases with cultivated area and with fallow biomass27. This 
term simply subtracts the marginal costs of cultivated area—namely, the marginal value 
of the lost fallow land and labor clearing costs—from the marginal benefits of increased 
crop production.  The equation corresponds to the first order condition for efficient land 
allocation given in equation (17) from case 3 of Chapter 3, substituting in for the steady 






























































The net elasticity of cultivated land (εnet) varies with the amount of land under 
fallow (f) and cultivation (x), the relative contributions of cropping and forest products to 
income (rcrop, rfor), total farm profits (πtot), and marginal land-clearing costs (l), factors 
that vary across all farms in the sample.  It also depends on the elasticities of crop 
production with respect to cultivated (εx) and fallow area (εf) and on the elasticity of 
forest product harvests with respect to fallow area (ξf), which can be approximated by the 
estimated parameters from the crop and forest product equations discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
27 Manual slash-and-burn is more common in the region than renting expensive mechanized equipment, and 
farmers in the Zona Bragantina spend 30 labor days per year clearing land for cropping on average.  Each 
additional hectare of land under production requires approximately 3 days of labor at a cost of $B 25 (US$1 
= $B 3).  I derive marginal land clearing labor, which I value at the agricultural wage rate, by regressing 
land clearing labor on cultivated and fallow land (with a quadratic term for land).  The Appendix presents 
the results of this regression (Table D1). 
28 To calculate whether each farm’s land allocation is socially rather than privately optimal, this term 
should account for any contribution of fallow to downstream neighbors’ output, corresponding to the first 
order condition for land allocation from case 1of Chapter 3 (equation (2)).   
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Finally, the rate of interest (r) is an important determinant of the optimal allocation of 
land between cultivation and fallow.  Higher interest rates justify lower levels of fallow 
biomass since the value of fallow is discounted more heavily (López 1997).  In the 
absence of primary data on interest rates in the region, I allow the interest rate to take on 
different values representing a range of plausible conditions in the Zona Bragantina29.
Optimal allocation of land between cultivation and fallow implies that the net 
elasticity of land is equal to zero.  If the net elasticity of land is significantly greater than 
zero at the 1% level30, I consider the farm to be over-fallowing; if it is significantly less 
than zero, the farm is under-fallowing.   
As an additional caveat, it is worth noting that the condition for optimal land 
allocation assumes that farmers are risk neutral, or alternately that fallow and cultivated 
land do not have different effects on the variance of crop output.  However, if farmers are 
risk averse and fallowing is a risk-mitigating input, then optimal land management may 
entail a greater allocation of land to fallow but appear as over-fallowing.  
Assuming a conservatively low 10% interest rate and calculating the net elasticity 
of land for every farm that allocates some land to fallow, I find that most farmers are 
fallowing optimally from an individual perspective (Table 6.1).  The average farm with 
some fallow land would not significantly increase farm profits by reallocating land 
between fallow and cultivation according to three out of the four models.  I cannot reject 
optimal land allocation for 51-76% of all farms in the sample.  Only 3-6% of farms 
 
29 I consider interest rates of 6%, 10%, and 20% to reflect the range in subsidized credit programs and 
market interest rates faced by farmers in the region.  The Fundo Constitucional de Financiamento do Norte 
(FNO) credit program offers subsidized credit of up to $B5000 to farmers at 6% interest (Borner 2005). 
Meanwhile, market interest rates available to farmers in Brazil tend to fall within 16-20% (ERS/USDA 
2005). 
30 Of course, if a less conservative significance level is used for hypothesis testing, such as 10%, the 
number of farms that appear to manage land optimally decreases quite substantially. 
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under-allocate land to fallow.  Meanwhile, the remaining 18-46% do devote excessive 
amount of land to fallow, a non-negligible proportion of farmers.  Figures D1-D4 present 
histograms of the net elasticity of cultivated land measures to give a more complete 
picture of the distribution of over- and under-fallowing across farmers.  They also 
indicate that most farms cluster at zero, though there are more farms devoting too much 
land to fallow than there are farms allocating too little.  While the elasticity estimates 
varies based on the econometric models used and entail a degree of imprecision, the 
extent of over-fallowing is underscored by the fact that at least 18% of farms with some 
fallow land could significantly increase profits by reallocating fallow land to cultivation 
according to all specifications.   
Table 6.1 Fallow management indicators assuming 10% interest rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) Observations 









Over-fallow (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.36 0.18 0.46 0.21 269 
Under-fallow (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.05 269 
Optimal fallow (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.60 0.76 0.51 0.74 269 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 
I report the same fallow management indicators assuming 6% and 20% interest 
rates in Tables D2 and D3.  Unsurprisingly, the appearance of over-fallowing increases if 
farms face a 20% interest rate.  In this case, the average farm is more likely to experience 
a significant increase in profits from shifting land out of fallow into cultivation according 
to both Models (1) and (3).  If farmers can obtain credit at much lower interest rates, such 
as those offered by the FNO, most seem to be fallowing efficiently.  However, this 
situation is quite unlikely given that the FNO rations these loans to $B5000 per farmer, 
and in practice, many find the loans inaccessible (Borner 2005, Andrae and Pingel 2001). 
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These results contrast those of López (1993, 1997, 1998), who finds farmers in 
Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire holding fallow in common property to clear excessive amounts 
of fallow for cultivation relative to the social optimum, indicating that private property 
ownership may improve the efficiency of land management.  However, without 
incorporating the value of fallow externalities into the net elasticity of land, these 
findings are not directly comparable with those from the West Africa studies.  In 
addition, it is unclear from these results whether over-fallowing can be explained by 
market failures such as credit constraints, or transportation costs, risk aversion, or other 
potential barriers to intensification, an issue I explore in the next section. 
6.1 Why are farmers over-fallowing? 
I examine the determinants of the net elasticity of cultivated land, a measure of 
the extent of over-fallowing from the farm’s individual perspective, to investigate 
potential constraints to efficient land use.  Market imperfections can affect fallow 
management by limiting the use of purchased inputs and capital investments important 
for continuous cultivation and restricting the amount of land that can be profitably 
cultivated at any one time.  Building on the literature on the causes of tropical 
deforestation, I consider a variety of economic and agroecological variables that may 
drive land-use decisions.      
Much of the literature on deforestation uses a land-rent model as a conceptual 
basis, noting that the net benefits to different land uses vary with agroclimatic and 
socioeconomic characteristics at the local or household level.  These studies have drawn 
attention to factors such as rainfall, road access, and population density, among others, as 
 
31 The net elasticity of cultivated land is only defined for farms with some amount of fallow land. 
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important determinants of land conversion.  Research focusing specifically on land 
allocation to forest fallow in the Amazon raises similar issues, highlighting off-farm 
income, distance from markets, soil quality, and land and labor availability (Scatena et al. 
1996, Coomes et al. 2000, Perz and Walker 2002).  These studies have not explicitly 
considered whether land use is efficient from the individual or social perspective, though 
they offer intuition about the expected effects of a range of variables. 
Liquidity constraints may be one factor leading to suboptimal input allocation 
(López and Romano 2000).  The theoretical model in Chapter 3 predicts that liquidity 
constraints restrict input purchases and spur farmers to allocate land away from 
cultivation to fallow.  Farms may be constrained in the amount of land they can profitably 
cultivate if they lack sufficient savings, cash income from off-farm sources, or credit to 
purchase optimal quantities of inputs.  However, recent studies from tropical forested 
regions reach no firm conclusions about the role of credit in forest and fallow 
management.  Municipio-level credit infrastructure does not significantly affect 
deforestation levels when controlling for population and road density (Pfaff 1999).  
While commercial credit use among households in a Pará frontier community had no 
impact on the share of land under fallow, off-farm income and ownership of mechanized 
equipment were negatively associated with fallowing, suggesting that liquidity may 
indeed affect fallow management (Perz and Walker 2002).  Municipio-level use of 
subsidized credit use is positively associated with deforestation in Chiapas and Oaxaca, 
Mexico (Deininger and Minten 2002).  A bio-economic simulation model of the Zona 
Bragantina indicates that improved credit access at subsidized interest rates does not 
affect land use or technology choice.  However, the model does not adequately reflect the 
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fixed capital-intensive costs of establishing perennial production, and increased credit 
may enable farmers to increase land under continuous cultivation under real-world 
circumstances (Borner 2005).   
Small-scale farmers in the Brazilian Amazon can access commercial credit 
through programs funded by the FNO.  However, despite the FNO’s mandate to target 
peasants with its agricultural credit schemes, complicated bureaucracy and other 
transaction costs render loans inaccessible to many poor farmers (Andrae and Pingel 
2001).  Only 31% of sampled farmers in the Zona Bragantina obtained any credit from a 
bank or cooperative during the previous decade (Table 4.1).   
I use farmer-reported commercial credit use and off-farm income (separated into 
wage income from agricultural and non-agricultural activities and non-wage income such 
as pensions, scholarships, and remittances) as three binary measures of liquidity.  Actual 
credit use may be arguably endogenous, depending not only on access to credit but also 
risk preferences, shocks, and farm technology choice.  In addition, credit access itself 
could be vulnerable to reverse causality with land and input management if farmers 
parlay better farm management abilities into improved credit-worthiness.  However, 
including this variable serves as an indicator of the correlation between credit availability 
and land and input management even if I cannot draw firm conclusions about the 
direction of causality.  This analysis also offers a complementary perspective to studies 
examining municipio-level credit availability by examining household credit use.  Off-
farm income may also be endogenous if better management skills lead to improved off-
farm employment opportunities, again preventing strong conclusions about the direction 
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of causality, but still demonstrating whether indicators of liquidity are correlated with 
fallow and input use.       
While evidence on the role of credit and land use remains ambiguous, the effect 
of transportation infrastructure on forest cover is quite consistent across many studies.  
Road density and distance to regional and national capitals significantly predict 
deforestation in the Amazon (Pfaff 1999, Chomitz and Thomas 2003).  The road 
infrastructure-deforestation relationship also holds in other tropical forested regions, 
including Belize, Mexico, and Thailand (Chomitz and Gray 1996, Nelson and Hellerstein 
1997, Cropper, Puri, and Griffiths 2001).  I include village-level transportation frequency 
and household-level distance to the local market to reflect the effect of transportation 
infrastructure in this analysis.   
Risk preferences may be another factor driving land allocation decisions, 
particularly if fallowing is a risk-mitigating factor of production.  The bio-economic 
model of Zona Bragantina agriculture predicts that higher risk aversion leads to increased 
reliance on fallow as an alternative to fertilizer and continuous cropping, which tend to 
produce higher but more variable yields (Borner 2005).  Risk-averse farmers may also 
fallow more land than optimal due to the difficulty in transitioning from continuous 
cultivation back to a fallow rotation system once the roots crucial for secondary fallow 
vegetation regeneration have been removed.  Collecting forest products may serve as a 
risk mitigation strategy, though the contribution of fallow to forest product income is 
already accounted for in the measure of over-fallowing.  Wealthier farmers, more able to 
absorb shocks, often invest in riskier but more lucrative activities than small farmers 
(Bardhan and Udry 1999, Binswanger and Rosensweig 1993).  Farmers with access to 
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perfect credit and insurance markets are also less vulnerable to shocks and can engage in 
activities generating more variable income.  I cannot control for variation in risk 
preferences or production risk explicitly due to data limitations.  However, the liquidity 
indicators discussed above may also be negatively associated with risk aversion.     
Other possible determinants of fallow management efficiency include 
agroecological factors.  Variation in soils and slopes may make fallowing more attractive 
on certain farms than others; land management that may initially appear as over-
fallowing may be an optimal response to poor soil quality.  Other studies from the 
Amazon (Chomitz and Thomas 2003, Pfaff 1999) and elsewhere (Cropper, Puri, and 
Griffiths 2001, Chomitz and Gray 1996, Nelson and Hellerstein 1997, Deininger and 
Minten 2002) show that deforestation is more likely to occur on land with good quality 
soil and faltter slopes.  In addition, education and extension assistance may affect fallow 
management if they play a role in farmer management ability and access to information 
about new technologies.  However, soil quality, farmer education, and extension 
assistance variables were included in estimating the parameters used to construct the net 
elasticity of cultivated land measure and therefore cannot be included as right hand side 
variables in this analysis without raising serious econometric concerns. 
6.1.1 Econometric issues 
The net elasticity of cultivated land is measured with error because of its 
construction using estimated parameters from the econometric analyses in Chapter 4.  
However, measurement error in the dependent variable is subsumed by the error term of 
the equation (Greene 2000).  Thus, as long as the explanatory variables are unrelated to 
the measurement error of the constructed over-fallowing variable, least squares estimates 
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are consistent despite the measurement error problem.  The net elasticity of land is 
undefined for farms that allocate no land to fallow, so I must exclude 14% of farms from 
the analysis. 
6.1.2 Results 
Results for the least squares estimation of the net elasticity of land are given in 
Table 6.2.  I report four sets of estimates corresponding to the four optimal fallowing 
variables reported in Table 6.1, which I derive using the parameters from Models (1)-(4) 
of the crop and forest product equations discussed in Chapter 4.  The included variables 
explain a relatively low proportion of the variation in the net elasticity of cultivated land, 
as seen in R-squared statistics of 0.04-0.05.     
Of particular interest are the effects of the liquidity indicators on fallowing.  Use 
of commercial credit is negatively and significantly correlated with the net elasticity of 
cultivated land across all four models.  In addition, higher wage income leads to a 
significant decrease in the over-fallowing measure.  Non-wage income has a significant 
though not significant effect on the elasticity, which is puzzling in light of the strong 
negative effects of credit and wage income on fallow management.   
These results suggest that liquidity constraints may play a role in restricting 
farmers’ opportunities for expanding cultivated land at the expense of fallow, whether 
through purchasing sufficient inputs, investing in capital or infrastructure, or other 
channels.  In addition, the links between credit use and off-farm wage income and the net 
elasticity of cultivated land may provide some evidence for the hypothesis that risk 
aversion leads to additional fallowing if credit and wage income are indeed correlated 
with risk preferences.  Experimental data on credit access would be ideal to clearly 
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identify the impact of liquidity constraints on fallow management.  Any new 
government-sponsored  credit programs in the study region (e.g., Proambiente or an 
expansion of FNO funding) would offer a good opportunity to collect such data if it is 
introduced to a random sample of eligible participants before it is widely implemented.   
Table 6.2 Net elasticity of cultivated land (over-fallowing) equation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Commercial credit use (binary) -0.492** -0.664** -0.487** -0.844** 
[0.238] [0.303] [0.224] [0.328] 
Off-farm wage income (binary) -0.434** -0.541* -0.369* -0.538* 
 [0.219] [0.279] [0.203] [0.296] 
Other off-farm income (binary) -0.204 -0.306 -0.147 -0.276 
 [0.221] [0.282] [0.206] [0.301] 
Distance from local market  -0.007 -0.009 -0.003 -0.008 
 [0.009] [0.011] [0.008] [0.012] 
Transportation frequency -0.006 -0.002 -0.015 -0.01 
 [0.085] [0.109] [0.076] [0.113] 
Constant 0.792* 0.868 0.707* 0.858 
 [0.455] [0.579] [0.408] [0.592] 
Observations 205 205 223 233 
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 
Standard errors in brackets   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Surprisingly, transportation indicators have no significant effect on the net 
elasticity of cultivated land across all models.  Neither the household’s distance from 
local markets nor the village-level transportation frequency affect land allocation 
efficiency.  These findings contrast those from other studies showing a strong link 
between roads and deforestation, but such results may apply only to virgin forest contexts 
rather than long-settled regions like the Zona Bragantina where proximity to regional 
markets is relatively strong and agriculture is already semi-commercialized.  Those 
results also apply to actual deforestation rather than the efficiency of the allotment of land 
to forest, which may account for the different findings in this study.         
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These empirical findings are consistent with predictions from the theory that 
liquidity constraints serve to limit overexploitation of fallow biomass resources.  Because 
biomass most likely does provide positive externalities to downstream farms, these 
liquidity constraints may act as a second-best option to keep excessive land clearing in 
check and prevent loss of community income due to diminished hydrological services 
from forest cover.  Liquidity constraints, particularly if severe, can decrease social 
welfare, however, so shying from economic development that would bring improved 
credit infrastructure and employment opportunities to the region is not likely to be a 
desirable strategy in meeting the objectives of poverty alleviation and environmental 
protection.  In addition, because the externality appears to flow upstream to downstream, 
loosening liquidity constraints may have different implications for social welfare 
depending on where currently-constrained farms are located within the sub-watershed.   
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7 Summary, policy implications, and conclusions 
Fallow makes an important contribution to farm output in semi-commercial, 
smallholder agriculture in the Zona Bragantina, a region with similar agroecological 
conditions and a somewhat more developed infrastructure than other frontier regions in 
Brazil where shifting cultivation is a mainstay of the economy.  Fallowing provides 
ecological services to farmers by improving land quality, and serves as a source of 
harvestable products.  The ecological literature also suggests that forest fallow provides 
not only ecological services of global value by sequestering carbon and providing habitat 
for tropical biodiversity, but offers locally valuable hydrological services as well.   
My econometric analysis finds evidence to support the latter claim by indicating 
that fallow is associated with higher agricultural revenues downstream.  Both on-farm 
and upstream fallow are correlated with higher yields of crops and forest products, and 
hence higher farm incomes.  Thus, farming communities may have some self-interest in 
preserving forest cover locally, even if transition to permanent cultivation becomes more 
attractive in the future.  I do not find evidence of strategic behavior in land use in 
response to these positive externalities; that is, farmers do not significantly expand or 
contract the area they allocate to fallow to take advantage of ecological services provided 
by their neighbors’ forest cover.  
While most farmers allocate land efficiently, a substantial minority of farms over-
fallow from a private perspective.  Farms that could generate more farm income by 
reallocating land from fallow to cultivation share certain characteristics—they earn 
significantly less income from off-farm activities and are significantly less likely to use 
credit, suggesting that liquidity constraints present a barrier to expanding cultivation, 
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even in the relatively developed Zona Bragantina.  A pilot approach introducing any new 
credit programs to a random sample of eligible participants would provide opportunities 
for a more conclusive study of the liquidity-land use link.  Land use that appears as over-
fallowing may be justified to some extent by the challenging agroecological conditions 
documented by agronomists in the Zona Bragantina, particularly on farms lacking high-
quality black clay soil.   
Because forest fallow appears to provide important local externalities, privately 
optimal land allocation may be insufficient to ensure that the optimal level of 
hydrological services reaches downstream farmers.  Thus, forest externalities may justify 
collective management to encourage higher levels of forest cover than those currently 
maintained by farmers.  In addition, removing liquidity constraints or other barriers to 
agricultural intensification may have ambiguous implications for community-level 
income, depending on the magnitude of the externality effect.   
7.1 Implications for tropical forest policy 
 The findings on secondary forest externalities and the role of liquidity constraints 
in land use have potentially important implications for policy-makers pursuing the 
objectives of poverty alleviation and forest conservation in the Amazon.  I consider a few 
key policy options suggested by the Brazilian government, the international community, 
and researchers to promote sustainable development.  In particular, I discuss the 
implications of my findings for expansion of current smallholder credit programs, the 
new Proambiente credit program, a tax on slash-and-burn, and direct subsidy payments 
for forest conservation.  Borner (2005) also discusses these policy options, among others, 
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in the context of his linear programming model of the Zona Bragantina over the next 25 
years. 
 Expanding access to the current FNO credit scheme, which provides loans of up 
to $B5000 per farmer at 6% interest, is one option to alleviate liquidity constraints in the 
region.  FNO loans have proven inaccessible to many small-scale farmers, as they are 
often approved on the basis of adoption of specific perennial crops and past use of 
extension services.  Infusing the program with additional funds and loosening collateral 
and technology adoption requirements may improve farmers’ access to loans, allowing 
for expanded cultivation within the existing shifting cultivation system.  Such agricultural 
intensification could have direct benefits to farmers but also risks indirect community-
level costs by decreasing forest hydrological services.  Thus, the net effect of this option 
for smallholders remains ambiguous. 
 The new Proambiente program, still in pilot phase, provides an alternative 
opportunity to expand credit access for smallholders.  However, the improved loan terms 
and subsidized technical assistance come with several restrictions on land use.  The 
program promotes riparian reforestation, chop-and-mulch land preparation, and 
permanent forest set-asides, and prohibits chemical fertilizer use and slash-and-burn.  
While these practices are likely to promote increased forest and fallow area, farmer 
income is likely to fall unless the value of increased hydrological services is sufficient to 
outweigh the losses in income due to decreased use of fertilizer and cultivated land.  
Indeed, Borner (2005) predicts decreases in farmer welfare, though some gains in fallow 
area at least meet the environmental objectives of the program.  In addition, my findings 
on the role of liquidity in land management imply that Proambiente could exacerbate 
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inequalities between unconstrained farmers who allocate land efficiently from a private 
perspective and constrained farmers who use the program to gain access to capital but are 
restricted in the technologies that they can adopt and ultimately the amount of land they 
can cultivate profitably.    
 Taxes on slash-and-burn land preparation are another policy tool with important 
ramifications for income and land use.  This tax would promote the chop-and-mulch land 
preparation technology purported to avoid the environmental and social costs associated 
with burning.  Large subsidies are likely necessary to promote adoption of this 
technology without significant loss of farmer incomes (Borner 2005).  In addition, the 
gains in terms of carbon storage are minimal in the long run, as decaying mulch 
eventually releases carbon to the atmosphere, albeit at a much slower rate than biomass 
burning.  This tax seems poised to exacerbate liquidity constraints, which may lead to 
increased fallow area but lower farmer incomes.  The tax may also create perverse 
incentives for farmers to transition entirely away from shifting cultivation to permanent 
cropping, which in the short run may boost forest cover, but in the long run is likely to 
diminish land under secondary forest and consequently, the amount of carbon stored in 
above- and below-ground biomass. 
 Direct payments to farmers for conserving forest or fallow on a per-hectare basis 
provide a more promising solution to raise incomes while expanding forest cover.  Such a 
subsidy could theoretically be set at a level to achieve the socially optimal allocation of 
land between cultivation and fallow.  It could also serve to alleviate liquidity constraints 
hindering optimal input use, leading to a first-best outcome for the community income.  
Borner (2005) estimates the minimum payment necessary to spur farmers to set aside 
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forested area to be $B100/ha.  Since forest cover provides local externalities to farmers 
flowing upstream to downstream, the payments could even be varied based on farms’ 
positions with the watershed to promote optimal forest cover patterns.  While such a 
program will no doubt be expensive to fund, direct payments for forest land may be the 
approach with the most potential to achieve the elusive “win-win” scenario for tropical 
forest livelihoods.   
7.2 Conclusions 
 This study adds to the growing body of literature quantifying the value of forest 
resources for human livelihoods, specifically agriculture.  Such knowledge is essential for 
policy-makers involved in land-use planning and economic development in forested areas 
where poverty remains widespread.  Fallow biomass provides economically important 
services to farmers, both as on-site benefits and as positive externalities to sites 
downstream.  The international community also has an interest in preserving forest fallow 
as a carbon sink that may help mitigate global climate change.  Policy options targeting 
farmers in tropical forested areas may have unanticipated effects due to local 
externalities, as well as liquidity constraints that appear to affect current land-use 
patterns.  Policy-makers must consider both direct and indirect effects of programs 
designed to alleviate poverty and conserve forest cover to help ensure that they will meet 
the desired objectives.   
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Appendix A: Comparative statics derivations 
Case 1 
 
To derive the steady state comparative statics for Case 1, I first substitute out µ 
using the expression in equation (6). Concentrating the problem in x-η space, the 
















the determinant of which is assumed positive to ensure that sufficiency conditions for a 
maximum are met.  Differentiating with respect to the parameters of interest, and using 



































































































































































































































































































To derive the comparative statics of x and θ with respect to p, A, and v assuming 
Cobb-Douglas functional forms for crops and forest products, I rewrite the net revenue 



















































































































































































Here I present comparative statics with respect to the credit and off-farm 
employment constraints and the wage rate when liquidity constraints are binding.  In this 
case, farmers maximize profits individually, not considering the value of fallow 
externalities.  I assume a Cobb-Douglas functional form, substituting in the equalities 
v
wMRz += and ch lLMl −−= for fertilizer and forest product labor, respectively.  The 












































































the determinant of which is negative, satisfying conditions for concavity.  The 
























































































































































































































Table B1. First stage OLS regressions for on- and off-farm fallow used in crop 
production equations 
















canopy cover –  
GIS data, 3km 
radius 
Log cultivated area -0.038 -0.012 -0.006 -0.01 
[0.087] [0.025] [0.080] [0.011] 
Log family labor -0.175** 0.02 -0.086 -0.006 
 [0.083] [0.023] [0.075] [0.010] 
Log hired labor 0.002 -0.027* 0 0.003 
 [0.056] [0.016] [0.051] [0.007] 
Log chemical fertilizer 0.023 -0.021 0.027 -0.014** 
 [0.052] [0.015] [0.046] [0.006] 
-0.053 -0.117*** -0.09 -0.014 Perennial producer 
(binary) [0.154] [0.043] [0.143] [0.019] 
-0.031 0.035 -0.038 0.005 Use extension services 
(binary) [0.156] [0.044] [0.141] [0.019] 
-0.006 0.001 -0.004 0.005* Household head’s 
schooling years  [0.023] [0.006] [0.021] [0.003] 
Farm owner (binary) 0.133 -0.032 0.147 0.030* 
 [0.134] [0.038] [0.123] [0.017] 
Black clay soil (binary) -0.246 -0.122** -0.186 -0.004 
 [0.217] [0.061] [0.203] [0.030] 
-0.022 -0.034 -0.053 0.002 Charcoal-enriched soil 
(binary) [0.183] [0.052] [0.181] [0.025] 
Poor soil (binary) 0.061 -0.069 -0.017 -0.005 
 [0.283] [0.080] [0.255] [0.034] 
Slope 0.074** 0.025** 0.039 0.003 
 [0.036] [0.010] [0.035] [0.005] 
-1.884*** 0.021 -1.840*** -0.025 No on-farm fallow 
(binary) [0.213] [0.060] [0.187] [0.025] 
No family labor (binary) -0.808 0.215 -0.177 0.08 
 [0.571] [0.161] [0.539] [0.074] 
No hired labor (binary) -0.016 -0.152** 0.041 -0.006 
 [0.242] [0.068] [0.219] [0.030] 
No fertilizer (binary) 0.106 -0.069 0.141 -0.026 
 [0.280] [0.079] [0.242] [0.034] 
1.177** -1.423***   No upstream fallow 
(binary) [0.491] [0.139]   
Log of farm size 0.856*** -0.032* 0.743*** 0.012 
 [0.063] [0.018] [0.058] [0.008] 
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0.005 0 0.008** 0 Forest product prices 
(farm-level) [0.004] [0.001] [0.004] [0.001] 
-0.133 -0.005 -0.067 0.056** Own firewood stove 
(binary) [0.169] [0.048] [0.160] [0.022] 
Own gas stove (binary) -0.048 -0.016 0.002 -0.013 
 [0.170] [0.048] [0.160] [0.022] 























































-0.04 -0.012 -0.165 0.039* Household head 










0.2 -0.119 0.036 0.092*** Farm owner – upstream 
weighted average [0.408] [0.115] [0.242] [0.034] 











-0.326 -0.159 -0.336 -0.119*** Charcoal-enriched soil –  
upstream weighted 
average [0.602] [0.170] [0.278] [0.038] 
0.132 -0.026 -0.166 0.005 Poor soil – upstream 
weighted average [0.540] [0.153] [0.401] [0.055] 
-0.041 -0.012 -0.032 0.016*** Slope – upstream 
weighted average [0.043] [0.012] [0.040] [0.005] 
Castanhal municipality 0.243 -0.175* 0.096 -0.182*** 
 [0.328] [0.093] [0.228] [0.031] 
Igarapé Açu municipality 0.044 -0.253** 0.222 -0.108*** 
 [0.365] [0.103] [0.217] [0.029] 
Constant 0.602 1.934*** 0.909 2.954*** 
 [0.810] [0.229] [0.657] [0.089] 
Observations 235 235 270 260 
32 The upstream neighborhood for each model corresponds to the respective upstream off-farm fallow 
definition: the neighborhood for Model 2 is all upstream households, while the neighborhood for Model 4 
is upstream area within a 3km radius. 
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R-squared 0.75 0.91 0.74 0.76 
Standard errors in brackets   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table B2. Instrumental variables validity checks: p-values from including each 
instrument individually in the crop production equation 
 Model 2 Model 4 
Log of farm size 0.94 0.93 
Forest product prices (farm-level) 0.22 0.21 
Own firewood stove (binary) 0.90 0.69 
Own gas stove (binary) 0.60 0.27 
Log of farm size – upstream weighted 
average33 0.46 0.83 
Forest product price – upstream weighted 
average 0.87 0.56 
Own firewood stove – upstream weighted 
average 0.21 0.64 
Own gas stove – upstream weighted 
average 0.16 0.41 
Use extension service – upstream weighted 
average 0.62 0.77 
Household head schooling – upstream 
weighted ave. 0.73 0.18 
Farm owner – upstream weighted average 0.73 0.64 
Black clay soil – upstream weighted 
average 0.48 0.27 
Charcoal-enriched soil – upstream weighted 
average 0.78 0.98 
Poor soil – upstream weighted average 0.72 0.90 
Slope – upstream weighted average 0.99 0.97 
Sargan test for overidentification 0.95 0.90 
Hausman Chi-2 test for joint exogeneity of 





33 The upstream neighborhood for each model corresponds to the upstream off-farm fallow definition: the 
neighborhood for Model 2 is all upstream households, while the neighborhood for Model 4 is upstream area 
within a 3km radius. 
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Table B3. Robustness analysis: crop production function excluding observations from top 

























0.100 0.111* 0.081 0.097 0.087 Log on-farm 
fallow area [0.060] [0.060] [0.068] [0.062] [0.067] 
0.367** 0.322* 0.374** 0.204 0.507*** Log off-farm 
fallow – survey 











0.412*** 0.447*** 0.381*** 0.371*** 0.380*** Log cultivated 
area [0.104] [0.111] [0.110] [0.111] [0.113] 
Log family labor 0.127 0.168 0.14 0.182* 0.117 
 [0.098] [0.107] [0.102] [0.106] [0.102] 
Log hired labor 0.177** 0.124* 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.187** 
 [0.068] [0.074] [0.072] [0.074] [0.073] 
0.147** 0.179*** 0.147** 0.114* 0.154** Log chemical 
fertilizer [0.058] [0.064] [0.061] [0.068] [0.061] 
0.913*** 0.875*** 0.983*** 0.964*** 0.903*** Perennial 
producer (binary) [0.186] [0.197] [0.196] [0.198] [0.194] 
0.264 0.246 0.208 0.193 0.31 Use extension 
services (binary) [0.186] [0.189] [0.200] [0.202] [0.200] 
-0.02 -0.026 -0.019 -0.015 -0.03 Household head 
schooling years [0.026] [0.027] [0.027] [0.028] [0.027] 
0.07 0.073 0.091 0.116 0.071 Farm owner 
(binary) [0.165] [0.175] [0.177] [0.176] [0.179] 
0.225 0.207 0.27 0.2 0.136 Black clay soil 
(binary) [0.248] [0.252] [0.274] [0.276] [0.281] 













Poor soil (binary) -0.123 0.074 -0.099 -0.203 -0.057 
 [0.325] [0.366] [0.333] [0.362] [0.334] 
Slope -0.01 -0.019 -0.022 -0.015 0.027 
 [0.029] [0.030] [0.031] [0.033] [0.036] 


























0.43  0.389 0.325 0.345 No on-farm 
fallow (binary) [0.300]  [0.310] [0.316] [0.321] 












1.258* 1.406* 1.213* 1.566** 1.183* No family labor 
(binary)  [0.685] [0.721] [0.722] [0.726] [0.706] 
0.024 -0.133 0.113 -0.001 0.084 No hired labor 
(binary) [0.297] [0.331] [0.309] [0.331] [0.319] 
0.178 0.221 0.149 0.042 0.234 No fertilizer 
(binary) [0.324] [0.353] [0.340] [0.367] [0.359] 
Constant 3.437*** 3.474*** 3.384*** 3.848*** 3.090*** 
 [0.665] [0.698] [0.699] [1.066] [0.719] 
Observations 228 199 205 205 207 
R-squared 0.6 0.62 0.59 0.59 0.59 
Standard errors in brackets    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table B4. Robustness analysis: crop production function excluding observations from top 

























0.099 0.07 0.078 0.101 0.119* Log on-farm 
fallow area [0.061] [0.084] [0.070] [0.064] [0.065] 
0.966** 0.994* 1.043** 0.918* 1.140** Log off-farm 
fallow – 3km 
upstream GIS 
canopy cover [0.489] [0.549] [0.506] [0.548] [0.529] 
0.442*** 0.490*** 0.408*** 0.426*** 0.397*** Log cultivated 
area [0.099] [0.109] [0.104] [0.103] [0.102] 
Log family labor 0.068 0.127 0.089 0.163 0.07 
 [0.093] [0.106] [0.097] [0.100] [0.096] 
Log hired labor 0.187*** 0.142** 0.204*** 0.169** 0.180*** 
 [0.064] [0.070] [0.067] [0.068] [0.067] 
0.169*** 0.184*** 0.171*** 0.162*** 0.162*** Log chemical 
fertilizer [0.059] [0.065] [0.062] [0.061] [0.062] 
0.835*** 0.770*** 0.892*** 0.837*** 0.833*** Perennial 
producer (binary) [0.173] [0.186] [0.182] [0.186] [0.181] 
0.21 0.304 0.149 0.134 0.279 Use extension 
services (binary) [0.173] [0.185] [0.185] [0.187] [0.182] 
-0.022 -0.033 -0.022 -0.026 -0.025 Household head 
schooling years [0.025] [0.027] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] 
-0.027 -0.077 -0.002 -0.071 -0.035 Farm owner 
(binary) [0.155] [0.173] [0.165] [0.163] [0.163] 
0.205 0.27 0.242 0.192 0.107 Black clay soil 
(binary) [0.245] [0.257] [0.270] [0.239] [0.264] 
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 [0.239] [0.234] [0.244] [0.230] 
Poor soil (binary) 0.134 0.352 0.154 0.187 0.142 
 [0.295] [0.332] [0.301] [0.302] [0.305] 
Slope -0.018 -0.028 -0.031 -0.011 0.001 
 [0.029] [0.031] [0.031] [0.029] [0.035] 


























0.531* 0 0.493* 0.587** 0.544* No on-farm 
fallow (binary) [0.275] [0.000] [0.288] [0.293] [0.287] 
0.844 1.095 0.811 1.916** 0.852 No family labor 
(binary)  [0.676] [0.718] [0.714] [0.737] [0.693] 
0.129 0.017 0.208 0.171 0.127 No hired labor 
(binary) [0.281] [0.316] [0.291] [0.301] [0.297] 
0.303 0.325 0.278 0.265 0.268 No fertilizer 
(binary) [0.314] [0.340] [0.328] [0.322] [0.336] 
Constant 1.325 1.148 1.007 1.195 0.777 
 [1.788] [2.017] [1.844] [1.973] [1.916] 
Observations 251 206 227 221 231 
R-squared 0.57 0.6 0.55 0.59 0.56 
Standard errors in brackets    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Figure B1. On-farm fallow elasticity in crop production and 95% confidence interval, 
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Figure B2. Upstream fallow elasticity in crop production and 95% confidence interval, 
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Figure B3. On-farm fallow elasticity in crop production and 95% confidence interval, 
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Figure B4. Upstream canopy cover elasticity in crop production and 95% confidence 
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Table B5. Bootstrap bias estimates for crop production function parameters, 500 
replications 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
On-farm fallow -0.004 -0.005 0.003 -0.0005 
Upstream fallow area 0.003 0.003   
Upstream canopy cover (3km 
radius) 
 -0.062 -0.095 










Log on-farm fallow area 0.107* 0.174** 0.099* 0.184** 
[0.058] [0.079] [0.059] [0.089] 
0.373** 0.403**   Log off-farm fallow – upstream 
survey fallow area  [0.157] [0.178]   
 0.918 0.418 Log off-farm fallow – 3 km 
upstream GIS canopy cover    [0.561] [1.014] 
-0.15 -0.302**   Log off-farm fallow – downstream 
survey fallow area [0.098] [0.140]   
 0.088 0.052 Log off-farm fallow – 3 km 
downstream GIS canopy cover   [0.577] [1.110] 
Log cultivated area 0.423*** 0.395*** 0.440*** 0.422*** 
 [0.099] [0.099] [0.097] [0.101] 
Log family labor 0.132 0.136 0.068 0.078 
 [0.093] [0.093] [0.089] [0.090] 
Log hired labor 0.166** 0.168*** 0.187*** 0.173*** 
 [0.065] [0.065] [0.061] [0.062] 
Log chemical fertilizer 0.145*** 0.147*** 0.170*** 0.163*** 
 [0.055] [0.055] [0.057] [0.059] 
0.896*** 0.907*** 0.832*** 0.822*** Perennial producer (binary) 
 [0.176] [0.176] [0.167] [0.169] 
Use extension services (binary) 0.236 0.242 0.208 0.194 
 [0.177] [0.177] [0.166] [0.170] 
Household head schooling years -0.018 -0.019 -0.023 -0.023 
 [0.025] [0.025] [0.024] [0.025] 
Farm owner (binary) 0.092 0.112 -0.027 -0.006 
 [0.157] [0.157] [0.149] [0.151] 
Black clay soil (binary) 0.201 0.146 0.211 0.225 
 [0.236] [0.237] [0.239] [0.246] 
Charcoal-enriched soil (binary) 0.342 0.316 0.381* 0.434* 
 [0.215] [0.216] [0.217] [0.225] 
Poor soil (binary) -0.184 -0.198 0.14 0.101 
 [0.310] [0.309] [0.284] [0.289] 
Slope -0.013 -0.019 -0.018 -0.009 
 [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.030] 
Castanhal municipality (binary) 0.238 0.152 0.611** 0.458 
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[0.228] [0.231] [0.248] [0.282] 
Igarapé Açu municipality (binary) 0.234 0.13 0.299 0.247 
 [0.230] [0.238] [0.216] [0.221] 
0.451 0.632* 0.532** 0.690** No on-farm fallow (binary) 
 [0.284] [0.323] [0.264] [0.311] 
1.247** 1.387**   No upstream fallow area (binary) 
 [0.606] [0.654]   
No family labor (binary)  1.269** 1.259* 0.848 0.906 
 [0.648] [0.645] [0.647] [0.656] 
No hired labor (binary) -0.033 -0.001 0.129 0.069 
 [0.284] [0.282] [0.270] [0.275] 
No fertilizer (binary) 0.195 0.183 0.305 0.272 
 [0.307] [0.308] [0.301] [0.304] 
Constant 3.787*** 3.968*** 1.17 2.792 
 [0.805] [0.851] [1.972] [2.527] 
-0.026 -0.045 -0.007 -0.022 Spatial error correlation coefficient 
(λ) [0.129] [0.125] [0.183] [0.150] 
Observations 228 228 251 251 
R-squared 0.60 0.60 0.57 0.56 
Log likelihood -312.65 -311.87 -349.63 -350.73 
Standard errors in brackets     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table B7. Forest product harvesting: Cragg hurdle vs. Tobit models









Log on-farm fallow area 0.243*** 0.064 0.595*** 0.275*** 0.023 0.639***
[0.091] [0.109] [0.190] [0.089] [0.113] [0.197]
0.389* 0.559** 1.242**Log off-farm fallow –upstream
survey fallow area [0.226] [0.276] [0.498]
1.086 0.954 2.695*Log off-farm fallow – 3 km
upstream GIS canopy cover [0.736] [0.831] [1.550]
-0.169 0.043 -0.283 0.107 0.157 0.29Forest product price (village
median) [0.143] [0.192] [0.310] [0.097] [0.175] [0.234]
Log household size 0.790*** 0.087 1.337*** 0.735*** 0.227 1.443***
[0.237] [0.267] [0.477] [0.214] [0.262] [0.466]
Agricultural wage rate -0.201** 0.026 -0.371** -0.182** -0.029 -0.363**
[0.081] [0.102] [0.177] [0.072] [0.089] [0.163]
Household head schooling years 0.036 0.035 0.107 0.029 0.074 0.124
[0.038] [0.047] [0.082] [0.036] [0.046] [0.082]
Farm owner (binary) 0.233 -0.192 0.262 0.009 -0.33 -0.248
[0.253] [0.270] [0.497] [0.222] [0.273] [0.486]
Own car (binary) -0.839** 1.237** -1.239 -0.748** 1.114** -1.079
[0.359] [0.529] [0.862] [0.344] [0.514] [0.854]
Own television (binary) -0.002 0.628** 0.339 0.052 0.697** 0.427
[0.281] [0.277] [0.541] [0.264] [0.275] [0.542]
Use electricity (binary) -0.672** -1.041*** -1.850*** -0.670**
-
1.031*** -1.845***
[0.291] [0.266] [0.520] [0.266] [0.268] [0.520]
Own firewood stove (binary) 0.238 0.433 1.296* 0.315 0.319 1.462**
[0.283] [0.380] [0.663] [0.267] [0.395] [0.670]
Own gas stove (binary)
-
1.157*** -0.011 -1.275** -0.959** 0.102 -1.035*
[0.445] [0.307] [0.617] [0.383] [0.305] [0.614]
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Black clay soil (binary) 0.781* 0.957** 1.798** 0.548 0.749* 1.593**
[0.441] [0.408] [0.781] [0.388] [0.402] [0.783]
Charcoal-enriched soil (binary) 0.184 -0.147 0.287 0.076 -0.453 -0.174
[0.340] [0.388] [0.718] [0.324] [0.397] [0.735]
Poor soil (binary) -0.325 0.477 -0.186 -0.273 0.63 -0.044
[0.528] [0.537] [1.029] [0.441] [0.521] [0.966]
Slope -0.009 -0.065 -0.118 -0.018 -0.074 -0.136
[0.045] [0.047] [0.088] [0.042] [0.047] [0.089]
Castanhal municipality (binary) 0.685** 0.661 1.597** 0.755* 0.668 1.772**
[0.345] [0.445] [0.747] [0.399] [0.491] [0.858]
Igarapé Açu municipality
(binary) 1.313*** 0.268 2.314*** 0.849** -0.067 1.232*
[0.399] [0.463] [0.783] [0.354] [0.410] [0.706]
No on-farm fallow area (binary) 0.249 -0.163 0.515 0.072 -0.095 0.214
[0.437] [0.569] [0.946] [0.394] [0.563] [0.930]
No upstream fallow area
(binary) -2.157* 0.403 -3.729
[1.125] [1.643] [2.525]
Constant 0.481 2.415 -0.478 -3.494 0.688 -8.854
[1.300] [1.617] [2.793] [2.499] [3.047] [5.451]
Observations 236 167 236 261 184 261
Log likelihood -98.25 -293.50 -481.25 -117.53 -331.05 -541.62
Likelihood ratio test of Tobit
restriction
0.00 0.00
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table B8. First stage OLS regressions for on- and off-farm fallow used in forest product 
equations 













Log of off-farm 
upstream  
canopy cover –  
GIS data, 3km 
radius 
-0.083 0.042* -0.171*** 0.014* Forest product price 
(village median) [0.082] [0.023] [0.054] [0.008] 
Log of household size -0.099 0.043 -0.092 -0.013 
 [0.122] [0.035] [0.110] [0.016] 
Wage rate -0.031 -0.021 -0.012 0.006 
 [0.046] [0.013] [0.040] [0.006] 
-0.003 0.007 -0.007 0.002 Household head’s 
schooling years  [0.021] [0.006] [0.020] [0.003] 
Farm owner (binary) 0.116 -0.059 0.094 0.031* 
 [0.130] [0.037] [0.117] [0.017] 
Car owner (binary) -0.22 -0.114* -0.241 -0.045 
 [0.223] [0.063] [0.202] [0.029] 
0.098 0.016 0.108 -0.03 Television owner 
(binary) [0.145] [0.041] [0.132] [0.019] 
Use electricity (binary) -0.092 -0.022 -0.053 0.017 
 [0.145] [0.041] [0.135] [0.020] 
-0.218 -0.01 -0.151 0.046** Own firewood stove 
(binary) [0.166] [0.047] [0.155] [0.023] 
Own gas stove (binary) -0.08 -0.013 -0.068 -0.007 
 [0.169] [0.048] [0.160] [0.024] 
Black clay soil (binary) -0.27 -0.075 -0.289 -0.008 
 [0.217] [0.061] [0.198] [0.029] 
0.025 -0.056 0.046 0.016 Charcoal-enriched soil 
(binary) [0.189] [0.053] [0.180] [0.027] 
Poor soil (binary) 0.082 0.006 -0.045 -0.032 
 [0.276] [0.078] [0.245] [0.036] 
Slope 0.047* 0.014** 0.038* 0.010*** 
 [0.025] [0.007] [0.023] [0.003] 
-1.995*** -0.004 -2.046*** -0.024 No on-farm fallow 
(binary) [0.202] [0.057] [0.182] [0.026] 
0.748 -1.280***   No upstream fallow 
(binary) [0.601] [0.170]   
Log of farm size 0.818*** -0.033** 0.745*** 0.017** 
 [0.058] [0.016] [0.052] [0.008] 
Log of farm size – -0.091 0.550*** -0.042 0.043*** 
 
34 The upstream neighborhood for each model corresponds to the respective upstream off-farm fallow 
definition: the neighborhood for Model 2 is all upstream households, while the neighborhood for Model 4 























0.051 0.033 0.11 -0.092*** Wage rate – upstream 
weighted average [0.141] [0.040] [0.240] [0.035] 











0.159 -0.205* 0.13 -0.021 Television owner 
(binary) – upstream 
weighted average [0.386] [0.109] [0.230] [0.034] 












































0.197 0.003 0.297 -0.125** Poor soil – upstream 
weighted average [0.459] [0.129] [0.379] [0.056] 
Castanhal municipality 0.233 -0.210* 0.406* -0.221*** 
 [0.387] [0.109] [0.227] [0.033] 
Igarapé Açu municipality 0.054 -0.277** 0.322 -0.107*** 
 [0.393] [0.111] [0.211] [0.031] 
Constant 0.304 1.594*** 1.485 3.185*** 
 [1.393] [0.393] [0.957] [0.139] 
Observations 236 236 271 261 
R-squared 0.74 0.9 0.74 0.72 
Standard errors in brackets   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table B9. Instrumental variables validity checks: p-values from including each 
instrument individually in the forest product probit and non-limit regression equations 







Log of farm size 0.31 0.75 0.33 0.96 




0.25 0.16 0.86 




0.28 0.53 0.69 
 




0.32 0.87 0.47 
 




0.45 0.16 0.65 
 




0.29 0.46 0.32 
 




0.62 0.44 0.76 
 




0.66 0.21 0.48 
 




0.89 0.61 0.98 
 




0.60 0.49 0.87 
 




0.51 0.16 0.50 
 
Sargan test for overidentification  0.77  0.95 






Hausman Chi-2 test for joint 






Wald test for joint exogeneity of on- 





35 The upstream neighborhood for each model corresponds to the upstream off-farm fallow definition: the 
neighborhood for Model 2 is all upstream households, while the neighborhood for Model 4 is upstream area 
within a 3km radius. 
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Table B10. Robustness analysis: forest product probit excluding observations from top 

























0.243*** 0.239*** 0.270*** 0.251*** 0.195* Log on-farm 
fallow area [0.091] [0.091] [0.103] [0.095] [0.101] 
0.389* 0.266 0.379 0.975** 0.264 Log off-farm 


























0.790*** 0.749*** 0.808*** 0.848*** 0.784*** Log household 
size  [0.237] [0.251] [0.250] [0.254] [0.242] 
-0.201** -0.202** -0.228*** -0.197** -0.204** Agricultural wage 
rate [0.081] [0.084] [0.086] [0.084] [0.081] 
0.036 0.033 0.055 0.052 0.039 Household head 
schooling years  [0.038] [0.041] [0.040] [0.040] [0.039] 
0.233 0.399 0.413 0.374 0.251 Farm owner 
(binary) [0.253] [0.270] [0.270] [0.266] [0.261] 
Own car (binary) -0.839** -0.735** -0.948** -0.898** -0.798** 
 [0.359] [0.372] [0.375] [0.365] [0.361] 
-0.002 -0.008 -0.142 -0.049 -0.05 Own television 
(binary) [0.281] [0.304] [0.304] [0.308] [0.297] 
-0.672** -0.640** -0.797** -0.687** -0.582* Use electricity 
(binary) [0.291] [0.300] [0.314] [0.314] [0.310] 
0.238 0.255 0.361 0.227 0.316 Own firewood 
stove (binary) [0.283] [0.307] [0.295] [0.304] [0.293] 
-1.157*** -0.869* -1.148** -0.984** -1.185** Own gas stove 
(binary) [0.445] [0.461] [0.461] [0.454] [0.469] 
0.781* 0.669 0.981** 0.394 1.063** Black clay soil 
(binary) [0.441] [0.461] [0.465] [0.476] [0.493] 













Poor soil (binary) -0.325 0.102 -0.276 -0.281 -0.333 
 [0.528] [0.625] [0.537] [0.553] [0.529] 
-0.009 -0.01 -0.006 -0.042 -0.017 Slope 
 [0.045] [0.047] [0.048] [0.053] [0.052] 















































Constant 0.481 0.811 0.173 -1.294 0.81 
 [1.300] [1.372] [1.344] [1.806] [1.343] 
Observations 236 203 213 213 212 
Pseudo R-squared 0.31 0.26 0.32 0.31 0.30 
Log likelihood -98.25 -86.23 -89.01 -85.81 -91.76 
Standard errors in brackets      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table B11. Robustness analysis: forest product probit excluding observations from top 





























0.275*** 0.277*** 0.299*** 0.275*** 0.333*** Log on-farm fallow 
area [0.089] [0.094] [0.101] [0.089] [0.129] 
1.086 -0.199 1.077 1.086 1.187 Log off-farm fallow – 
3km upstream GIS 











0.107 -0.307* 0.123 0.107 0.350** Forest product price 
(village median) [0.097] [0.177] [0.100] [0.097] [0.153] 
Log household size  0.735*** 0.792*** 0.733*** 0.735*** 0.987*** 
 [0.214] [0.241] [0.223] [0.214] [0.307] 
-0.182** -0.167** -0.203*** -0.182** -0.039 Agricultural wage 
rate [0.072] [0.076] [0.075] [0.072] [0.115] 
0.029 0.028 0.041 0.029 0.035 Household head 
schooling years  [0.036] [0.040] [0.037] [0.036] [0.048] 
Farm owner (binary) 0.009 0.389 0.119 0.009 0.17 
 [0.222] [0.257] [0.231] [0.222] [0.317] 
Own car (binary) -0.748** -0.869** -0.838** -0.748** -0.728* 
 [0.344] [0.367] [0.356] [0.344] [0.434] 
0.052 -0.017 -0.064 0.052 -0.438 Own television 
(binary) [0.264] [0.299] [0.283] [0.264] [0.441] 
-0.670** -0.601** -0.759*** -0.670** 0.146 Use electricity 
(binary) [0.266] [0.294] [0.284] [0.266] [0.414] 
0.315 0.228 0.437 0.315 0.275 Own firewood stove 
(binary) [0.267] [0.307] [0.278] [0.267] [0.346] 
-0.959** -1.052** -0.927** -0.959** -0.821 Own gas stove 
(binary) [0.383] [0.460] [0.394] [0.383] [0.560] 
0.548 0.738 0.696* 0.548 1.074 Black clay soil 
(binary) [0.388] [0.463] [0.406] [0.388] [0.925] 
0.076 0.304 0.042 0.076 -0.41 Charcoal-enriched 
soil (binary) [0.324] [0.361] [0.328] [0.324] [0.491] 
Poor soil (binary) -0.273 -0.242 -0.244 -0.273 -0.806 
 [0.441] [0.510] [0.447] [0.441] [0.526] 
-0.018 0.01 -0.016 -0.018 -0.048 Slope 
 [0.042] [0.046] [0.044] [0.042] [0.089] 
0.755* 0.708 1.040** 0.755* 0.1 Castanhal 
municipality (binary) [0.399] [0.460] [0.423] [0.399] [0.663] 
0.849** 0.956** 0.948** 0.849** 0.626 Igarapé Açu 
municipality (binary) [0.354] [0.426] [0.372] [0.354] [0.720] 
No on-farm fallow 0.072  0.174 0.072 0.23 
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area (binary) [0.394]  [0.408] [0.394] [0.523] 
Constant -3.494 2.421 -3.651 -3.494 -6.601 
 [2.499] [3.093] [2.570] [2.499] [4.833] 
Observations 261 222 237 261 136 
Pseudo R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.28 
Log likelihood -117.53 -92.94 -107.75 -117.53 -64.66 
Standard errors in brackets      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table B12. Robustness analysis: forest product non-limit regression excluding 




























0.043 0.058 -0.008 -0.052 0.056 Log on-farm fallow 
area [0.125] [0.127] [0.156] [0.126] [0.138] 
0.565* 0.506 0.637* -0.644 0.601* Log off-farm fallow – 
upstream survey 











0.063 0.111 0.071 0.057 0.108 Forest product price 
(village median) [0.210] [0.215] [0.227] [0.218] [0.226] 
Log household size  0.153 0.098 0.184 0.338 0.121 
 [0.296] [0.314] [0.326] [0.305] [0.318] 
0.002 -0.015 0.024 0.006 0.026 Agricultural wage 
rate [0.113] [0.115] [0.125] [0.113] [0.119] 
0.026 0.024 0.007 -0.014 0.025 Household head 
schooling years  [0.052] [0.054] [0.058] [0.053] [0.057] 
Farm owner (binary) -0.24 -0.23 -0.325 -0.366 -0.454 
 [0.297] [0.315] [0.333] [0.297] [0.333] 
Own car (binary) 1.288** 1.314** 1.512** 1.282** 1.273** 
 [0.577] [0.586] [0.616] [0.567] [0.598] 
0.585* 0.643** 0.437 0.496 0.588* Own television 
(binary) [0.304] [0.323] [0.349] [0.308] [0.329] 
-1.025*** -1.197*** -1.139*** -0.890*** -0.962*** Use electricity 
(binary) [0.293] [0.309] [0.330] [0.297] [0.322] 
0.325 0.107 0.228 -0.038 0.301 Own firewood stove 
(binary) [0.441] [0.474] [0.494] [0.457] [0.497] 
-0.026 -0.229 0.156 0.085 -0.123 Own gas stove 
(binary) [0.336] [0.356] [0.383] [0.340] [0.379] 
0.958** 1.075** 0.749 1.083** 0.742 Black clay soil 
(binary) [0.446] [0.461] [0.521] [0.457] [0.533] 
-0.218 -0.28 -0.075 0.239 -0.344 Charcoal-enriched 
soil (binary) [0.431] [0.437] [0.468] [0.455] [0.461] 
Poor soil (binary) 0.462 0.811 0.566 0.37 0.374 
 [0.582] [0.629] [0.612] [0.584] [0.612] 
-0.063 -0.074 -0.047 0.015 -0.093 Slope 
 [0.052] [0.054] [0.059] [0.059] [0.079] 
0.676 0.741 0.57 0.291 0.555 Castanhal 
municipality (binary) [0.495] [0.505] [0.543] [0.531] [0.559] 
0.299 0.07 0.245 -0.186 0.198 Igarapé Açu 
municipality (binary) [0.510] [0.522] [0.567] [0.574] [0.586] 
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-0.267 0 -0.381 -0.578 -0.447 No on-farm fallow 
area (binary) [0.639] [0.000] [0.704] [0.636] [0.691] 
0.424 0.17 0.883 0 0.468 No upstream fallow 
area (binary) [1.792] [1.817] [1.904] [0.000] [1.910] 
Constant 2.622 3.229* 2.448 6.796*** 2.557 
 [1.785] [1.849] [1.970] [2.306] [1.901] 
Observations 161 146 141 150 143 
R-squared 0.18 0.2 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Standard errors in brackets      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table B13. Robustness analysis: forest product non-limit regression excluding 




























0.023 0.045 -0.036 0.023 0.025 Log on-farm fallow 
area [0.119] [0.122] [0.151] [0.119] [0.230] 
0.947 0.843 1.153 0.947 -1.934 Log off-farm fallow – 
3km upstream GIS 











0.156 0.244 0.162 0.156 0.085 Forest product price 
(village median) [0.184] [0.230] [0.197] [0.184] [0.327] 
Log household size  0.226 0.188 0.243 0.226 0.415 
 [0.276] [0.297] [0.302] [0.276] [0.519] 
Agricultural wage rate -0.029 -0.028 -0.006 -0.029 -0.053 
 [0.094] [0.097] [0.102] [0.094] [0.144] 
0.074 0.079 0.061 0.074 0.062 Household head 
schooling years  [0.048] [0.051] [0.053] [0.048] [0.086] 
Farm owner (binary) -0.328 -0.314 -0.375 -0.328 -0.765 
 [0.287] [0.307] [0.324] [0.287] [0.531] 
Own car (binary) 1.112** 1.086* 1.292** 1.112** 1.516** 
 [0.542] [0.556] [0.574] [0.542] [0.738] 
Own television (binary) 0.692** 0.719** 0.611* 0.692** 0.376 
 [0.289] [0.311] [0.332] [0.289] [0.512] 
Use electricity (binary) -1.024*** -1.177*** -1.119*** -1.024*** -1.042* 
 [0.282] [0.303] [0.317] [0.282] [0.539] 
0.317 0.164 0.279 0.317 0.693 Own firewood stove 
(binary) [0.416] [0.459] [0.461] [0.416] [0.635] 
Own gas stove (binary) 0.102 -0.061 0.261 0.102 0.634 
 [0.321] [0.343] [0.362] [0.321] [0.680] 
Black clay soil (binary) 0.746* 0.871* 0.515 0.746* -0.679 
 [0.423] [0.443] [0.490] [0.423] [1.309] 
-0.447 -0.506 -0.364 -0.447 -0.14 Charcoal-enriched soil 
(binary) [0.417] [0.429] [0.452] [0.417] [0.898] 
Poor soil (binary) 0.625 0.976 0.748 0.625 0.01 
 [0.549] [0.596] [0.579] [0.549] [0.762] 
-0.074 -0.08 -0.064 -0.074 -0.175 Slope 
 [0.049] [0.052] [0.055] [0.049] [0.131] 
0.665 0.666 0.615 0.665 0.614 Castanhal municipality 
(binary) [0.517] [0.549] [0.578] [0.517] [1.143] 
-0.066 -0.291 -0.139 -0.066 0.483 Igarapé Açu 
municipality (binary) [0.431] [0.474] [0.489] [0.431] [1.118] 
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-0.094 0 -0.193 -0.094 -0.838 No on-farm fallow area 
(binary) [0.592] [0.000] [0.657] [0.592] [0.965] 
Constant 0.722 1.02 -0.013 0.722 10.231 
 [3.205] [3.653] [3.460] [3.205] [7.143] 
Observations 184 166 163 184 85 
R-squared 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.28 
Standard errors in brackets      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Figure B5. On-farm fallow elasticity in forest product harvests and 95% confidence 
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Figure B6. Upstream fallow elasticity in forest product harvests and 95% confidence 
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Figure B7. On-farm fallow elasticity in forest product harvests and 95% confidence 
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Figure B8. Upstream fallow elasticity in forest product harvests and 95% confidence 
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Log on-farm fallow area 0.299*** 0.304** 0.315*** 0.422*** 
[0.123] [.152] [0.104] [0.153] 
0.496** 1.487   Log off-farm fallow – upstream 
survey fallow area  [0.263] [1.888]   
-0.281 -1.373   Log off-farm fallow – 3 km 
upstream GIS canopy cover [0.302] [1.547]   
 1.323 1.728 Log off-farm fallow – downstream 
survey fallow area   [1.048] [1.780] 
 -0.024 -0.380 Log off-farm fallow – 3 km 
downstream GIS canopy cover   [0.915] [1.499] 
-0.276* -0.233* 0.103 0.113 Forest product price (village 
median) 0.180] [0.167] [0.110] [0.117] 
Log household size  0.964*** 1.014*** 0.882*** 0.906*** 
 [0.269] [0.266] [0.263] [0.242] 
Agricultural wage rate -0.238*** -0.246*** -0.210*** -0.201** 
 [0.098] [0.095] [0.084] [0.079] 
Household head schooling years  0.053 0.060* 0.027 -0.028 
 [0.046] [0.043] [0.242] [0.246] 
Farm owner (binary) 0.297 0.238 0.041 0.050 
 [0.308] [0.295] [0.042] [0.041] 
Own car (binary) -0.980** -0.986*** -0.859*** -0.822** 
 [0.426] [0.411] [0.381] [0.387] 
Own television (binary) -0.037 0.091 0.058 0.069 
 [0.314] [0.323] [0.297] [0.317] 
Use electricity (binary) -0.799** -0.846*** -0.816*** -0.748*** 
 [0.344] [0.343] [0.334] [0.313] 
Own firewood stove (binary) 0.266 0.338 0.381 0.403* 
 [0.319] [0.328] [0.296] [0.317] 
Own gas stove (binary) -1.411*** -1.504*** -1.118*** -1.186*** 
 [0.484] [0.548] [0.475] [0.428] 
Black clay soil (binary) 0.792* 0.631* 0.614* 0.516 
 [0.551] [0.495] [0.452] [0.461] 
Charcoal-enriched soil (binary) 0.150 0.114 0.060 0.121 
 [0.397] [0.385] [0.391] [0.376] 
Poor soil (binary) -0.475 -0.439 -0.293 -0.339 
 [0.587] [0.610] [0.524] [0.506] 
Slope -0.027 -0.033 -0.019 -0.036 
 [0.048] [0.053] [0.049] [0.054] 
Castanhal municipality (binary) 0.660* 0.837* 0.888** 0.848* 
 [0.419] [0.569] [0.480] [0.545] 
Igarapé Açu municipality (binary) 1.420*** 1.310*** 0.954** 0.899** 
 [0.474] [0.464] [0.438] [0.441] 
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No on-farm fallow area (binary) 0.211 0.541 0.082 0.445 
 [0.545] [0.596] [0.428] 0.503] 
No upstream fallow area (binary) -2.540** -4.281***   
 [1.297] [1.282]   
Constant 1.800 1.784 -4.152 -4.692 
 [1.758[ [5.023] [3.353] [4.238] 
0.548*** 0.545*** 0.511*** 0.502*** Spatial error correlation coefficient 
(λ) [0.264] [0.248] [0.253] [0.265] 
Observations 236 236 261 261 
McFadden R-squared 0.30 0.29 0.25 0.25 
Standard errors in brackets    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table B15. Forest product harvesting: conditional outcome equation including 










Log on-farm fallow area 0.066 0.257* 0.018 0.132 
[0.107] [0.144] [0.113] [0.150] 
0.546* 1.63   Log off-farm fallow – upstream 
survey fallow area  [0.281] [1.632]   
 0.586 -1.568 Log off-farm fallow – 3 km 
upstream GIS canopy cover   [0.982] [1.901] 
-0.015 -1.257   Log off-farm fallow – downstream 
survey fallow area [0.175] [1.686]   
 0.68 3.161* Log off-farm fallow – 3 km 
downstream GIS canopy cover   [1.099] [2.221] 
0.035 0.15 0.157 0.181 Forest product price (village 
median) [0.188] [0.188] [0.175] [0.175] 
Log household size  0.088 0.239 0.198 0.312 
 [0.265] [0.271] [0.264] [0.272] 
Agricultural wage rate 0.027 -0.009 -0.026 -0.049 
 [0.100] [0.101] [0.088] [0.088] 
Household head schooling years  0.03 0.057 0.069 0.080* 
 [0.047] [0.047] [0.046] [0.046] 
Farm owner (binary) -0.188 -0.146 -0.339 -0.34 
 [0.269] [0.274] [0.272] [0.282] 
Own car (binary) 1.213** 1.206** 1.077** 1.250** 
 [0.525] [0.530] [0.513] [0.521] 
Own television (binary) 0.626** 0.726*** 0.691** 0.743*** 
 [0.280] [0.276] [0.272] [0.273] 
Use electricity (binary) -1.074*** -1.111*** -1.024*** -1.012*** 
 [0.274] [0.277] [0.267] [0.266] 
Own firewood stove (binary) 0.409 0.397 0.299 0.255 
 [0.380] [0.395] [0.392] [0.423] 
Own gas stove (binary) -0.018 -0.171 0.123 0.071 
 [0.308] [0.309] [0.306] [0.310] 
Black clay soil (binary) 0.957** 0.709* 0.815** 0.7 
 [0.417] [0.421] [0.413] [0.431] 
Charcoal-enriched soil (binary) -0.128 -0.254 -0.414 -0.518 
 [0.388] [0.392] [0.396] [0.401] 
Poor soil (binary) 0.432 0.505 0.67 0.631 
 [0.545] [0.557] [0.527] [0.561] 
Slope -0.063 -0.065 -0.074 -0.106** 
 [0.048] [0.049] [0.047] [0.052] 
Castanhal municipality (binary) 0.643 0.526 0.727 0.898 
 [0.444] [0.519] [0.500] [0.702] 
Igarapé Açu municipality (binary) 0.227 -0.27 -0.033 -0.044 
 [0.471] [0.433] [0.411] [0.432] 
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No on-farm fallow area (binary) -0.178 0.668 -0.135 0.329 
 [0.563] [0.634] [0.563] [0.639] 
No upstream fallow area (binary) 0.408 -1.287   
 [1.635] [1.462]   
Constant 3.01 2.537 -0.391 -1.879 
 [2.066] [4.204] [3.812] [7.424] 
0.153 0.198    0.053    0.037    Spatial error correlation coefficient 
(λ) [0.185] [0.196] [0.218] [0.275] 
Observations 167 167 184 184 
R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.19 
Log likelihood -293.22 -292.77 -330.89 -329.30 
Standard errors in brackets    




Table C1. First stage equations for upstream forest fallow used in 2SLS spatial model of 




3km upstream GIS 
canopy cover 
Forest product price 0.018 -0.005 
[0.033] [0.022] 
Annual crop village price index 10.861 -56.354 
 [13.639] [49.276] 
Perennial crop village price index -0.278 -1.444 
 [0.540] [2.809] 
Fertilizer crop village price index -8.193 -8.858 
 [7.780] [6.585] 
Transportation cost 371.907* 139.316 
 [204.822] [138.193] 
Transportation frequency 0.301 4.901 
 [0.712] [3.390] 
Wage rate -0.105 0.043 
 [0.335] [0.153] 
Log of household size 1.132 -0.213 
 [0.892] [0.429] 
Log of farm size -0.666 0.215 
 [0.428] [0.196] 
Farm owner (binary) 0.193 0.633 
 [0.943] [0.440] 
Household head schooling years 0.018 0.073 
 [0.158] [0.074] 
Own firewood stove (binary) -2.445** 1.273** 
 [1.195] [0.570] 
Own gas stove (binary) 0.063 -0.783 
 [1.299] [0.609] 
Own car (binary) -2.944* -1.748** 
 [1.593] [0.748] 
Own television (binary) 0.321 -0.546 
 [1.071] [0.500] 
Use electricity (binary) -1.255 -0.222 
 [1.128] [0.580] 
Poor soil (binary) -1.097 -0.1 
 [1.991] [0.923] 
0.355 0.488 Charcoal-enriched soil (binary) 
 [1.397] [0.689] 
Black clay soil (binary) -0.923 0.933 
 [1.685] [0.810] 
Slope 0.159 0.126 
 [0.274] [0.128] 
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0.011 0.071** Forest product price– upstream 
weighted average36 [0.217] [0.028] 
-14.026 60.25 Annual crop price index – upstream 
weighted average [13.872] [49.236] 
4.341*** 0.415 Perennial crop price index – upstream 
weighted average [1.026] [2.838] 
Fertilizer – upstream weighted average -42.191** -0.427 
 [19.449] [8.225] 
314.884 315.621** Transportation cost – upstream 
weighted average [284.011] [152.636] 
-7.552*** -4.396 Transportation frequency – upstream 
weighted average [1.428] [3.467] 
Wage rate – upstream weighted 
average 3.959*** -1.115*** 
 [1.200] [0.361] 
3.555 -3.574*** Log of household size – upstream 
weighted average [4.202] [1.007] 
10.372*** 0.929*** Log of farm size – upstream weighted 
average [1.053] [0.332] 
22.829*** 4.333*** Farm owner – upstream weighted 
average [4.203] [1.122] 
1.006 2.570*** Household head schooling years – 
upstream weighted average [0.661] [0.624] 
-15.347*** 7.459*** Own firewood stove – upstream 
weighted average [4.930] [1.262] 
-0.385 0.726 Own gas stove – upstream weighted 
average [5.116] [1.110] 
Own car – upstream weighted average -39.419*** -5.692*** 
 [7.745] [1.674] 
17.075*** -1.045 Own television – upstream weighted 
average [3.775] [1.048] 
-9.638*** -1.632* Use electricity – upstream weighted 
average [3.349] [0.977] 
-36.206*** -0.827 Poor soil (binary) – upstream 
weighted average [7.791] [1.237] 
1.535 4.161** Charcoal-enriched soil (binary) – 
upstream weighted average [6.487] [2.110] 
-9.945* 2.258 Black clay soil (binary) – upstream 
weighted average [5.164] [1.551] 
0.348 -0.279 Slope – upstream weighted average 
 [0.552] [0.185] 
Castanhal municipality (binary) -23.826*** 1.244 
 [4.534] [1.467] 
 
36 The upstream neighborhood for each model corresponds to the upstream off-farm fallow definition: the 
neighborhood for Model 2 is all upstream households, while the neighborhood for Model 4 is upstream area 
within a 3km radius. 
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Igarapé Açu municipality (binary) -9.963* -1.641 
 [5.124] [1.364] 
Constant 15.235 30.434*** 
[27.734] [5.993] 
Observations 236 261 
R-squared 0.81 0.82 
Standard errors in brackets 




Table D1. Land clearing labor regression 
 Land clearing labor 
Cultivated area 3.568*** 
[0.882] 
Cultivated area squared -0.079*** 
[0.021] 






Standard errors in brackets  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Table D2.Fallow management indicators assuming 6% interest rate  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) Observations 









Over-fallow (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.29 0.12 0.42 0.13 269 
Under-fallow (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 269 
Optimal fallow (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.68 0.83 0.55 0.84 269 
Table D3. Fallow management indicators assuming 20% interest rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) Observations 









Over-fallow (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.44 0.31 0.50 0.33 269 
Under-fallow (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.05 269 
Optimal fallow (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.52 0.63 0.46 0.62 269 
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Net elasticity of cultivated land (Model 1)
 












Net elasticity of cultivated land (Model 2)
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Net elasticity of cultivated land (Model 3)
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